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Hindutva, Neoliberalism and the Reinventing of India 
 
By Kalim SIDDIQUI1† 
 
Abstract. The 2014 parliamentary election in India reduced Congress party to merely 44 
seats in the lower house, big blow for a party whose history is integral the country’s 
founding narrative. In the last parliamentary election the Congress party polled only 19.3% 
of the votes declining from 28.6% in 2009, while on the other hand the main right wing 
party i.e. BJP won 282 parliamentary seats and 31% of the national votes. The extreme 
right-wing organisations have undoubtedly become the central pole of Indian politics. 
Moreover, its recent success in Uttar Pradesh provincial election, which is one of the most 
populated province with 215 million inhabitants, is the strongest evidence yet of the 
broader shift to the right and the BJP’s victory in UP state strengthens this shift. This paper 
intends to study the recent rise of extreme right-wing Hindu organisations in India. Most 
prominent among these organisations are RSS, BJP, VHP, Bajang Dal and Shiv Sena. 
However, all of them work together under the philosophy of Hindutva (i.e. Hindu-ness) and 
are rabidly anti-minority in their stance. The aim of this study is to highlight the recent rise 
in extreme right-wing Hindu organisations and to examine their ideas and philosophy 
regarding Indian history and culture. It is also useful to set this against a global context in 
which divisive and ultra-nationalist forces are on the rise within Europe and Donald Trump 
has assumed the US presidency. The study argues that the adoption of neoliberal economic 
policy in 1991 has increased GDP, but hardly any expansion in employment, which is 
known as ‘jobless growth’. The study also finds the far right encroachment into India’s 
liberal institutions and it seems that Indian polity is undergoing a historically unprecedented 
change with extreme-right to dominance into vast areas of ideology, economy and culture.  
Keywords: India, Hindutva, Neo-liberalism, Secularism and minorities. 
JEL. N30, N35, N40. 
 
1. Introduction 
his paper examines the socio-economic basis of right-wing political activism 
by Hindu organisations in India. Most prominent among these organisations 
are RSS, BJP, VHP, Bajang Dal and Shiv Sena. However, all of them work 
together under the philosophy of Hindutva (i.e. Hindu-ness) and are rabidly anti-
minority in their stance. Since the BJP (Bhartiya Janata Party) came to power in 
India in 2014, its ministers and senior party leaders have been coming out in 
support of the Hindu rastra (Hindu nation). They have stepped up their campaign 
against mixed-marriage with Muslims and have sought to rewrite textbooks to 
reflect the ideas of the RSS (RastriyaSevak Sangh, literally the Association of 
National Volunteers) (Sen, 2015). This study intends to analyse the ideas and 
philosophy of the RSS on the basis of the organisation’s publications and public 
statements made by its leader. 
The aim of this study is to highlight the recent rise in extreme right-wing Hindu 
organisations and to examine their ideas and philosophy regarding Indian history 
and culture. It is also useful to set this against a global context in which divisive 
and ultra-nationalist forces are on the rise within Europe and Donald Trump has 
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assumed the US presidency. Therefore, it is important to study Hindu nationalists 
whose divisive views are well known. In the past Hindutva organisations have 
campaigned against minorities and have also often been found to have been 
involved in violent attacks against them and in propagating false information to 
create further misconceptions about these groups. For this reason, minorities in 
India feel insecure. (Sen, 2015) 
The 2014 parliamentary election reduced Congress party to merely 44 seats in 
the lower house, big blow for a party whose history is integral the country’s 
founding narrative. In the last parliamentary election the Congress party polled 
only 19.3% of the votes declining from 28.6% in 2009, while on the other hand the 
main right wing party i.e. BJP won 282 parliamentary seats and 31% of the 
national votes. The extreme right-wing organisations have undoubtedly become the 
central pole of the Indian politics. Moreover, its recent success in Uttar Pradesh 
provincial election, which is one of the most populated province with 215 million 
inhabitants, is the strongest evidence yet of the broader shift to the right and the 
BJP’s victory in UP state strengthens this shift. 
The BJP is the political front of the RSS and most of the BJP leaders, including 
the Prime Minister Narendra Modi, have been members of the RSS. Even before 
becoming Prime Minister, Modi had reaffirmed his commitment to Hindutva: ‚The 
nation and Hindus are one. Only if Hindus develop will the nation develop. Unity 
of Hindus will strengthen the nation‛ (Organiser February 11, 2007 cited in 
Noorani, 2015). BJP and RSS are fully committed to the ideology of Hindutva, 
which is deeply rooted in hatred of India’s religious minorities, particularly 
Muslims and Christians. At present, the RSS has millions of members spread 
throughout most parts of India with more than 50,000 shakhas (branches). It also 
runs thousands of schools where young minds are poisoned with hate against 
Muslims. In Uttar Pradesh State alone, there are some 20,000 RSS-controlled 
shishumandir schools which teach that the Muslims and Christians are unreliable 
people stirring up hatred against both Muslims and Christians, with children being 
taught that both these groups are foreigners and outsiders. (Oza, 2007) 
This study is important because the RSS is too politically significant to be 
ignored and since its political wing has come to power i.e. the BJP attacks against 
Muslims have risen sharply. Cultural issues such as cow slaughter and the building 
of a Ram temple at Ayodhya have been raised again by the RSS as a means of 
dividing communities and keeping Muslims in a state of constant fear and 
insecurity. The RSS/BJP also claims that mosques at Kashi (also known as 
Varanasi) and Mathura are disputed places of worship.  
Since the BJP came to power in May 2014, religious minorities have begun to 
feel more insecure and vulnerable. Even government ministers and members of 
parliament have openly aired communalist (i.e. reactionary and divisive) 
sentiments, making hate speeches and inciting violence against minorities. In a 
recent public meeting, the BJP Member of Parliament Sakshi Maharaj is reported 
to have said that ‚Good days have come; now those with four wives and 40 
children should not be allowed in the country‛ (cited in Vijayan & Gabriel, 2015: 
22). The BJP leaders continue to spread false information about Muslims. They are 
also threatening to launch a ghar-wapsi (return home) programme, i.e. enforced 
conversion of religious minorities back to Hinduism. As London based Economist 
(2015) commented:  
The BJP’s election victory last year was attributed to its promise of 
competence and good governance. It persuaded enough voters that the Hindu-
nationalist part of its agenda and the shadow over […] past allegations of his 
[Modi’s] complicity in anti-Muslim violence in the state of Gujarat in 2002 
were marginal. Now many worry that Hindu nationalism is a pillar of Mr 
Modi’s vision, after all (Economist, 2015:71). 
The BJP’s ghar wapsi (return to your home) campaign seems to be a 
contemporary version of the Shudhi (purification) movement. Swami Dayananda, 
who started Arya Samaj in 1875, organised Shudhi rituals and was seen as the 
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architect of Hindu revivalism. The Arya Samaj attempted the reconversion of 
untouchables (now known as Dalits) who had become Muslims or Christians in 
Punjab. For Swami Dayananda, the Hindu Varna system was a model for social 
cohesion to which each caste should adhere, including Dalits, after they underwent 
the process of Shudhi (Jaffrelot, 1996). 
The problem of communalism2 in India can be understood as a problem of 
community relation between Hindus and the Muslim minority. Prejudice and 
violence amongst India’s religious communities did not decline after the creation 
of Pakistan and independence (Siddiqui, 2013). If anything, the task of reassessing 
this situation and looking for a deeper understanding of it is even more important 
than it was previously. In the Indian context, communalism is defined as the 
‘political use’ of religion. The paper seeks to examine why religious identity in 
India became so politicised in the late 1980s. Communalism is very much a ruling 
class politics, as it reflects an underlying relationship between class and power 
relations. The struggle against communalism should be linked with a much wider 
struggle against the existing social order, as Singh (1990:19) stresses that, 
‚Communalism in contemporary India, as ideology and practice, is above all an 
aspect of the politics of the ruling classes in a society with a massive feudal-
colonial inheritance, deep religious divisions, and undergoing its own, historically 
specific form of capitalist development‛.  
Also we should not ignore the fact that since the 1980s socio-economic changes 
have taken place in the northern Indian cities, where a sizeable Muslim population 
live and work in handicrafts and small-scale industries. Some members of this 
community have migrated to the Middle East where the demand for their products 
has increased since the oil boom in that region. These developments have disturbed 
traditional patterns in which Muslim artisans were dependent on Hindu traders, 
both to sell their finished products and to provide them with the capital they 
needed. The fact that some Muslim artisans have become independent 
entrepreneurs certainly exacerbated the antagonism between Hindus and Muslims. 
The local Hindu elites saw this changing situation as a threat and religion was used 
as a convenient tool with which to mobilise people (Hasan, 1988). 
However, despite these economic improvements for some Muslims in a few 
urban centres, socio-economic conditions for the vast majority of Muslims have 
deteriorated. For example, the Justice Sachar Committee Report found that socio-
economic conditions for the Muslim community in India are abysmally low, 
marginally above that of Dalits and worse than backward castes. The Sachar 
Committee Report clearly indicates that Indian Muslims suffer ‘socioeconomic 
deprivation’. The Report particularly highlighted the under-representation of 
Muslims in government administrative services, police, and education, and their 
low levels of access to health facilities (Noorani, 2014). This under-representation 
seems to be a conscious effort by the government to deprive them and exclude 
them from the government’s beneficial social and economic policies fearing that 
Hindu extremists might see this as appeasement of Muslims (Oza, 2007). 
For example, the Hindutva bogey of Muslim appeasement has no factual basis, 
as socio-economic indicators show that Muslims are far below the national 
average; and in education and health specifically, this community’s performance is 
the worst, but the government has taken no steps to address this. The BJP 
government totally disregards such facts and common sense but they continue to be 
touted in RSS shakhas and boudhikbaithaks. Whatever Prime Minister Modi says 
about Muslim appeasement is the result of his being a ‘Hindu nationalist’ and 
having been groomed as a political leader by Guru Golwalkar, the second supremo 
of the RSS, also referred to as the ‘Guru of Hate’ (Noorani, 2015). 
 
2Communalism is an extreme right wing politics, which is based on the idea that religion is the 
principal basis of the organising society. 
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Narendra Modi had only been Chief Minister of Gujarat for four months when 
the Godhra train incident occurred in February 2002, and this killing of dozens of 
Hindus triggered anti-Muslim violence. He had been dispatched to replace the 
sitting BJP Chief Minister, in order to stem the slide in support. Before that, Modi 
had been a party strategist, but had never been fielded in electoral politics and had 
no experience of governance. The BJP has long been accused of encouraging 
religious conflicts in Gujarat state to win votes. Paul Brass (2006a) observed that in 
1990-91 the BJP and Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) played a significant role in 
deliberately instigated violence in north India. In 1990, the BJP President L.K. 
Advani went on a Rathyatra (a "chariot" procession) across several states, 
triggering riots in its wake. Using religious mobilisation for political ends, the BJP 
went from practically no presence in the Indian parliament in 1984 to becoming the 
second largest party by 1991. However, the manipulation of incidents of violence 
for electoral gain is not unique to the BJP. Brass found that it was already a central 
feature of Indian politics by the 1980s, with Indira Gandhi adept at the "politics of 
crisis" (Brass, 2006a). 
At present, India faces an immense threat from fascism in the guise of Hindu 
nationalism. The ideology of Hindutva has received widespread coverage in the 
press in recent years, but it is a crude attempt to camouflage upper-caste Hindu 
groups, who have used religion as a tool to maintain their hegemony over the vast 
majority of the Indian people. In terms of their everyday experience, there is 
virtually nothing which would be common to all Hindus and to talk about one 
single ‘Hindu community’ is misleading. Brahminical revivalism began in the 8th 
century to the establishment of the Sultanates by the 12th century, the hegemonic 
cultures in India were Maurya (Buddhist) (5th century BCE-8th century CE), the 
Sultanates (1206-1526), the Mughals (1526-1757) and the British (1757-1947). 
Most Buddhists were converted to Hinduism and yet we are told that Hinduism is 
very tolerant religion. During British rule, in the census the tribal peoples were put 
into a separate category as following an ‘animistic’ religion; however, after 
independence this category disappeared from government records by the time of 
the 1951 census, and tribal peoples who had not converted to Christianity were 
recorded by the government as Hindus (Singh, 2015). 
Also we should not ignore the fact that since the 1980s socio-economic changes 
have taken place in the northern Indian cities, where a sizeable Muslim population 
live and work in handicrafts and small-scale industries. Some members of this 
community have migrated to the Middle East where the demand for their products 
has increased since the oil boom in that region. These developments have disturbed 
traditional patterns in which Muslim artisans were dependent on Hindu traders, 
both to sell their finished products and to provide them with the capital they 
needed. The fact that some Muslim artisans have become independent 
entrepreneurs certainly exacerbated the antagonism between Hindus and Muslims. 
The local Hindu elites saw this changing situation as a threat and religion was used 
as a convenient tool with which to mobilise people (Hasan, 1988). 
However, despite these economic improvements for some Muslims in a few 
urban centres, socio-economic conditions for the vast majority of Muslims have 
deteriorated. For example, the Justice Sachar Committee Report found that socio-
economic conditions for the Muslim community in India are abysmally low, 
marginally above that of Dalits and worse than backward castes. The Sachar 
Committee Report clearly indicates that Indian Muslims suffer ‘socioeconomic 
deprivation’. The Report particularly highlighted the under-representation of 
Muslims in government administrative services, police, and education, and their 
low levels of access to health facilities (Noorani, 2014). This under-representation 
seems to be a conscious effort by the government to deprive them and exclude 
them from the government’s beneficial social and economic policies fearing that 
Hindu extremists might see this as appeasement of Muslims (Oza, 2007). 
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2. Economic Crisis and Neoliberal Reforms 
When India gained independence, the industrial bourgeoisie supported the 
Bombay Plan as a blueprint for India’s modernisation with active state intervention 
in the economy, especially in key areas such as infrastructure and education. Public 
investments were also seen necessary to build irrigation, electricity, and steel 
industries, a policy known as ‘import-substitution industrialisation’. However, the 
deepening crisis in the late 1960s in the form of slowing growth rates, rising 
deficits and external debts  (see Figure 1) led to the progressive de-regulation of the 
Indian economy with the aim of spurring growth and expanding the narrow growth 
market (Siddiqui, 2014a). 
The 1980s witnessed the coming to maturity of India’s bourgeoisie, who was 
initially sceptical towards foreign capital and competition. With the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, the Indian ruling elites also started to look for closer integration with 
global capitalism. By the late 1980s levels of public debts rose to unprecedented 
levels (see Figure 1) and also India experienced then sharp decline in exports and 
balance of payments crisis. To resolve it, the government decided to approach 
international financial institutions including IMF (Siddiqui, 2015a). An IMF loan 
was sought in 1991 and, in return, India was asked to make changes to its 
economic policy and the country has to adopt neoliberal policies also known as 
‘Structural Adjustment Programmes’.  
With the adoption of neoliberalism, the Indian economy was opened up, imports 
were liberalised and taxes on capital were reduced. As a result, in the period from 
1991 to 2001 GDP growth increased by 5.7% annually (see Figure 2), which shows 
no significant increase over that of 1980s. With the adoption of neoliberal 
economic reforms, the inflows of foreign capital have rapidly increased in India 
(Siddiqui, 2017). 
As a result, in the period from 1991 to 2001 GDP growth increased by 5.7% 
annually (See Figure 2), which shows no significant increase over that of 
1980s.With the adoption of neoliberal economic reforms, the inflows of foreign 
capital have rapidly increased in India as shown in the Figure 3.The consumers 
price have risen sharply, however, since 2010 it has slightly declined (as shown in 
Figure 4). More disturbing is that since 1997, the agriculture and manufacturing 
sectors, which account for more than four-fifths of India’s workforce, have only 
grown 2.3% and 4.5% respectively, compared to the 11.5% increase in the 
financial services per year (Siddiqui, 2015b).  
 
 
Figure 1. External Debt Stocks, (in current $ US) 
Source: World Development Indicator (2015) The World Bank. 
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Figure 2. GDP annual growth in India and China, 1991-2014 (in %). 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Foreign Direct Investment, net inflows (Bop, current US$) 
Source: World Development Indicator (2015), Washington DC: The World Bank. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) 
Source: IMF, national sources. 
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Figure 5. Growth and Sectoral Share in GDP (2004-05 series) at constant prices 
Source: Economic and Political Weekly, EPWRF India Time Series Database, [Retrieved from]. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Annual Merchandise Export Growth Rate of India and the World from 2001 to 
2015 
Source: Nagaraj, (2017:63). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. India’s Share in Global Trade 
Source: Nagaraj, (2017:62). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. World’s Top 10 Manufacturing Nations, 2000-2010 
Source: UNIDO’s International Yearbook of Industrial Statistics, 2012. 
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More disturbing is that since 1997, the agriculture and manufacturing sectors, 
which account for more than four-fifths of India’s workforce, have only grown 
2.3% and 4.5% respectively, compared to the 11.5% increase in the financial 
services per year (see Figure 5) (Siddiqui, 2015b). Within the primary sector, 
agriculture continues to account for 50% of the workforce, even though its share of 
GDP is now around only 10% (see Table 1). For the last two decades, agrarian 
crisis across many parts of the country has impacted adversely on the farmers and 
rural workers. Services activities recently include advance services, which accounts 
for more than 60% of the GDP (Siddiqui, 2016a). We have had two years of the 
Modi government, if we assess back to what has changed. On the economic front, 
it is clear that very little has changed for the majority of the population. Investment 
rates are still down, unemployment has increased and rural real wages are falling, 
and material insecurities of crucial groups such as farmers and informal workers 
are actually increasing. In order to improve on these indicators, the government 
would require a drastic change of economic policy direction, which seems unlikely 
from the Modi government. 
 
Table 1. Structural Change in the Indian Economy 
Period Percent of GDP 
(3-years average) Investment rate Share of primary 
sector 
Share of 
secondary sector 
Share of tertiary 
sector 
1950-52 15.5 59.0 13.4 27.6 
1960-62 19.4 53.1 17.3 29.6 
1970-72 23.8 46.6 20.4 33.0 
1980-82 22.0 41.3 21.8 36.9 
1990-92 26.0 34.4 24.0 41.6 
2000-02 26.2 26.1 24.7 49.2 
2008-10 30.2 17.9 25.3 56.8 
2012-14 31.4 12.8 26.4 60.6 
Source: CSO, National Accounts Statistics, various years, Government of India, New Delhi. 
 
The government has not paid much attention in recent decades to demand-side 
constraints, mainly focusing on supply-side constraints to alter the slow rate of 
industrialisation on the recommendations of the IMF and World Bank. We should 
not ignore the changing nature of the composition of both Indian and foreign 
markets. The reasons for the slow growth of industries could also explain lack of 
job creation. The sectoral shift in favour of services and economic liberalisation 
means the further opening up of Indian markets has led to the increase in imports 
of goods especially for the richer sections of society. As shown in Figure 6 that the 
annual merchandise export growth Rate of India has risen. However, it is very 
much associated with the world’s economic growth and demands. India’s Share in 
global trade has risen, (Siddiqui, 2016b) but the country is still at the bottom of 
theworld’s top tenmanufacturing nations, just slightly above Brazil. (See Figure 7 
and 8) Increased reliance on exports would mean Indian industries have to produce 
goods that are in demand on the world market, manufactured using modern 
technology, which is often labour-saving. Increasing reliance on MNCs, which 
employ capital saving technology and high import intensity of domestic 
manufacturing, reduces the employment elasticity of growth. 
During the second term of the Congress Party government, the economic crisis 
increased. At an aggregate level, the GDP growth rates sharply declined from 8.6% 
per annum in 2009-2010 to 4.7% in 2013-14 (Siddiqui, 2014b). The fiscal deficit 
also rose to new heights. In addition, the rate of inflation remained at very high 
levels of over 10% per annum for the period 2010-2014 whilst unemployment also 
remained high. Moreover, a large number of financial scams linked to the 
Commonwealth Games, 2G frequency allocations, and the coal scams further 
tarnished the government’s image. Since the adoption of neoliberal reforms, India 
has undergone substantial transformation. The nature of exploitation has changed 
and some sections of society have become relatively affluent, while many others 
have faced dispossession and joblessness. The right-wing Hindu organisations were 
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able to channel this discontent among the people and as a result the BJP led by 
Modi came to power in May 2014 (Siddiqui, 2016c). 
However, neoliberal policies to deliver growth are already exhausted. Providing 
a further dose will hardly provide any new impetus. In the recent past i.e. in 2008 
with the advent of the global financial crisis, a number of measures helped to 
restore growth temporarily, including the provision of loans for housing and 
consumer goods to boost middle-class demand (Siddiqui, 2014c). But this has its 
own limitations bringing the risk of credit bubbles and balance of payments 
difficulties given the high import content of middle-class consumption. 
The neo-liberal policy was adopted in India in 1991, which was fully supported 
by the mainstream economists and international financial institutions. As T.N. 
Srinivasan noted, ‚They [the reforms] were solidly based on an understanding of 
what went wrong with Indian development strategy since 1950 that delivered 
neither rapid growth nor appreciably greater equity‛ (Srinivasan, 1993: 258). 
Similar views were expressed by Jagdish Bhagwati who identified the three main 
policy factors that stifled India’s growth and efficiency as: ‚extensive bureaucratic 
controls over production, investment and trade; inward looking trade and foreign 
investment policies, and a substantial public sector, going well beyond the 
conventional confines of public utilities and infrastructure‛ (Bhagwati, 1993:48). 
Others, such as Joshi and Little argued that India’s industrial policy was 
responsible for its persistent fiscal deficits and periodic balance of payment crises. 
In their opinion, ‚India’s control system was not only micro-economically 
inefficient but macro-economically perverse‛. (Joshi & Little, 1994:3) It seems that 
the proponents of neoliberalism are only focused on GDP growth rates, ignoring 
human developmental and other socio-economic issues facing the Indian 
population. 
A large section of the domestic bourgeoisie in India would,who also like to go 
along with the idea of being junior partners of international finance capital. I do not 
want to go into the question of whether the bourgeoisie is comprador or not. When 
I refer to their desire to be junior partners, I am not claiming that this has been and 
always will be an intrinsic characteristic of the bourgeoisie; I am simply saying that 
at this juncture in Indian history, a large section of the Indian bourgeoisie would 
like to go along with the US imperialists.  
Since the adoption of neoliberal policy has accentuated relative inequalities, 
repeated communal violence has segregated communities and ghettoised the 
Muslim community in cities like Ahmedabad, Bhopal, Mumbai and so on. 
Neoliberal and corporate-led growth, with a heavy reliance on market forces for 
employment and welfare, have displaced the earlier policies of state-sponsored 
equity and created increased insecurities and tensions that scapegoat vulnerable 
minorities, tribal peoples and Dalit, all of whom have become easy targets for 
collective violence. Government statistics confirm that most of the causalities in 
the riots were Muslims and they suffer far more in terms of property loss than those 
who are members of the dominant majority (Lokhande, 2015). Whenever neo-
liberal economic policies have been pursued in the developing world, they have 
always been accompanied by divisive political forces.  
Neo-liberalism focuses excessively on growth and overlooks other crucial 
elements like inequality, unemployment and poverty. There is a need to bring 
growth with equity and to ensure a regime of human rights that is committed to 
justice, equality and fraternity for all. 
India’s agriculture, manufacturing, and exports are all showing a downward 
trend, while misery and unemployment is growing and the demographically young 
India is moving towards increased economic and social insecurity. Economic 
deterioration and rising unemployment made rampant by globalisation has 
provided the right conditions for chauvinistic mass mobilisation. Fascism requires 
a period of economic crisis as a necessary condition for its mass growth. A re-
colonised economy serving the interests of the advanced capitalist countries is sure 
to cause widespread frustration. In recent years, the take-over of the nationalist 
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space by fascist forces has left the Indian constitution and the judiciary vulnerable 
to cynical distortion and manipulation. Even the Congress Party is now less 
interested in confronting the Hindutva forces head on. In the former colonies 
nationalism originally emerged as a result of people transcending narrow sectarian 
and cultural barriers in their struggle against imperialism. However, the calculated 
invisibility of new forms of imperialism has rendered the whole political space 
ambiguous and utterly chaotic. 
In the name of economic reforms, Modi’s government strategy seems to be to 
cut subsidies, increase regressive taxes and capital expenditure and privatise public 
sector banks and state-owned enterprises such as the Indian Railways. It has also 
undertaken capital expenditure projects such as setting up smart cities. All these 
measures will certainly accelerate the process of handing the Indian economy over 
to the big corporations, who financed him and supported his rise to power. By 
taking these polices measures, India surrendering its sovereignty to global finance 
capital. 
It would be useful to briefly discuss neoliberalism here. Neoliberalism can be 
said to follow specific economic policies that may not be in the interest of the 
majority of the Indian people, but in the interests of finance capital (Siddiqui, 
2012). Neoliberalism insists on cutting fiscal deficits because it wants to reduce the 
capital expenditure of the state. This is based on the deeply flawed premise that the 
private sector will take the burden off the state, especially in a developing economy 
like India. Under neoliberalism, the market is assigned the supreme role and the 
state abdicates responsibility especially for tackling the enormous growing 
inequalities and making economic policies subservient to international finance 
capital (Girdner & Siddiqui, 2008). Development is defined merely as an increase 
in growth rates achieved by ‚encouraging‛ inflow of foreign capital by 
multinational companies. Such pro-foreign business policy also requires facilitating 
corporate takeovers of domestic businesses, lands and mineral resources from rural 
people (Siddiqui, 2014a). 
The term ‘neo-liberalism’ has been widely used by academics to characterise 
contemporary capitalism. However, it is often not clearly defined or well 
understood. Once the supremacy of the market is restored, then the source of power 
is not driven by the state but by the market and the corporate sector. Despite the 
belief among neoliberals that the state should withdraw from the economy, it has, 
in fact, always played an important role in capitalist economies, since the market 
relations of capitalism depend on the protection of property rights, which was 
considered to be a key function of the state (Girdner & Siddiqui, 2008). The term 
‘neoliberal’ dates back to the 1930s, when some European and North American 
academics used it to revive liberal ideas. Neoliberal capitalism received new 
recognition with the deepening economic crisis in the 1970s. After Margaret 
Thatcher became British Prime Minister in 1979 and Ronald Reagan became US 
President shortly after in 1981, both leaders extended their support for neoliberal 
ideas and began to introduce these as policy measures. In fact, in both US and UK 
support for neoliberalism occurred after the dramatic hike in oil prices in the 1970s 
and 1980s, which resulted in the accumulation of a large amount of liquidity in the 
banks. International financial institutions were desperately looking for ways of 
investing this capital and chose to lend it to the developing countries, which were 
earlier thought to represent too big a risk. A number of scholars have discussed 
neoliberal capitalism since it was officially recognised as a policy solution in the 
West and later extended to other countries (Harvey, 2005; Stiglitz, 2010).  
Neoliberalism has dominated the advanced economies and the rest of the world 
since the 1980s. It advocates a minimal role for the state and strongly favours 
private property and a free market (Siddiqui, 2012). Neoliberalism, also referred as 
the ‘Washington Consensus’, was imposed in the developing countries by the 
powerful global financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank and also 
received full support from governments in the developed countries. Neoliberal 
ideas are based on very individualistic human interests, in a society where human 
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welfare is dependent on the freedom to choose, and the market facilitates and 
allows individual choices to run the economy. These ideas were first promoted 
with the publication of Frederick Hayek’s book The Road to Serfdom in 1944 but 
then Keynesian ideas gradually became more acceptable to the governments in 
Western Europe and North America.  
However, during the 1970s economic crisis, these Keynesian policies were 
replaced by neoliberal economic policies when Milton Friedman revived Hayek’s 
ideas that the ‘free market’ would assure optimal performance, providing economic 
growth, technical progress, efficiency and welfare, and ultimately it would be able 
to secure individual liberty. Friedman (1962) asserted that the ‘free market’ 
naturally maintains full employment and an optimal rate of growth and that any 
state intervention to promote these goals is unwarranted and will only worsen 
economic performance in the long term. By focusing on individuals’ ethics and 
behaviour, Friedman laid the intellectual foundations for a conservative, anti-
Keynesian and anti-state policy framework. In the 1980s his academic works were 
used by Thatcher and Reagan to attack Keynesian policy and ‚roll back the state‛. 
The term had been widely used in the 1970s in critiques of Chile’s economic 
policies under General Pinochet and, with Friedman’s guidance neoliberal policy 
was launched there following the military coup.  
Ha-Joon Chang (2014) notes:  
The liberal golden age of 1870-1913 was thus as liberal as we think. It was 
getting less liberal in the core capitalist countries, in terms of both domestic 
and international policies. Liberalization happened mostly in the weaker 
countries, but out of compulsion rather than choice–through colonialism and 
unequal treaties. In the only peripheral region that experienced rapid growth 
during this period, namely Latin America, there was a vast increase in 
protectionism following the expiry of unequal treaties (Chang, 2014:72). 
He further observes that,  
Colonialism often meant the deliberate destruction of existing productive 
activities in the economically more advanced regions. Most importantly, in 
1700, Britain banned the import of Indian cotton textile (especially calicoes) 
[…] in order to promote its own textile industry, dealing a heavy blow to 
Indian cotton textile industry. The industry was finished off in the mid-19th 
century by the influx of exports from the mechanised British cotton textile 
industry. As a colony, India could not use tariff and other policy measures to 
protect its own producers against British imports. In 1835, Lord Bentinck, the 
Governor-General of the East India Company, famously reported that ‘bones 
of cotton weavers are bleaching the plains of India’ (Chang, 2014:56). 
However, Hayek completely ignored the important role state played in laying 
down the foundations of industrialisation and overall economic development in the 
West during the 19th century and also during the post-war reconstruction and more 
recently in Japan and South Korea. More than three decades of neoliberal policies 
has weakened the trade unions, which were once a powerful countervailing force to 
challenging the rule of capital in the West. Moreover, it seems that a number of 
factors have led to attacks on the bargaining power of labour which is undermining 
national sovereignty. These include the adoption of neoliberal capitalism since the 
early 1990s and its inability to create more employment, while generating 
irreversible inequalities and increased globalisation. This policy has led to a 
situation, where a tiny minority has increased their wealth, while the majority have 
not witnessed any improvement in their living conditions. As Komlos (2016) notes,  
The concentration of wealth in the United States has assumed obscene 
proportions with just 3 percent of the population owning half of the country’s 
total wealth. It goes without saying that such enormous wealth enables the 
elite not only to engage in conspicuous consumption that makes the rest of 
the population feel inferior but also enables them to ‚buy‛ economists as well 
as politicians (Komlos, 2016:492). 
Hayek failed to take into account the possibility of this concentration of wealth 
and power, which could pose a threat to freedom and democracy. The free market 
that he advocated has led to the dramatic concentration of economic power in the 
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hands of the corporate and powerful elites. Moreover, in a highly competitive 
globalised world, the state needs to assist people by providing the necessary 
support for health and educational opportunities that are the absolute prerequisite 
for acquiring the skills that are needed in order to succeed in a highly competitive 
labour market.  
The neo-liberal period has also been linked with the rise in globalisation and 
financialisation. Since its inception, capitalism has shown a tendency to expand 
into new territories but more recently its global spread has increased significantly 
via international trade and economy. As Epstein (2005:3) notes, in the era of 
neoliberalism, capitalism is reflected in the ‚increasing role of financial motives, 
financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the operation of 
domestic and international economies‛.  
Neoliberalism has been defined as a contemporary form of capitalism, which is 
associated with a specific set of policies, differentiating it from the regulated form 
of capitalism, known as, that dominated during the period from 1945 to the mid-
1970s in the developed capitalist countries. Neo-liberal capitalism broadly refers to 
a particular institutional form of capitalism in which the financial sector plays a 
key role, operating under a new set of rules that includes deregulation and capital 
liberalisation. As Kotz has emphasised, 
The concept of neoliberal, or free-market, capitalism does not mean that the 
state plays no role in the economy. Market relations and market exchange 
require a state, or state-like institution, to define and protect private property 
and to enforce the contracts that are essential feature of market exchange 
[…]. The maintenance of a strong military is fully consistent with the 
neoliberal view of the proper role of the state. The meaning of ‚free-market‛ 
in this context is that the state role in regulating economic activity is limited, 
apart from the preceding essential state functions, leaving market relations 
and market forces as the main regulators of the economic activity − but of 
course operating within a framework provided by the state. (Kotz, 2015:9) 
For the last three decades, the role of finance and financial institutions in the 
economy has changed radically; financial market activity has increased, the value 
of financial assets has risen sharply and foreign exchange transactions have grown 
much faster than the volume on of international trade. The institutions of 
neoliberalism have greatly expanded the role of market relations and market forces. 
There has been a shift from the post-war social democratic consensus of capital-
labour compromise to the domination of labour by capital. As Kotz (2015) 
observes: ‚[Neoliberal capitalist policies] obviously are related to this change in 
the capital-labour relation – particularly the marginalisation of collective 
bargaining and the casualization of jobs – for some others the connection to the 
increased power of capital is not so obvious‛ Kotz (2015:43). 
 
3. Religious Rivalry in the Colonial Period 
Communalism is often viewed as the product of religion when in reality it is the 
product of competitive politics. The increased oppression by the colonial rulers led 
to the religious communities both Muslims and Hindus especially in the late 19th 
century moved towards religious revivalism. Bagchi (2010) argued,  
There were two different paths to Muslim revivalism taken in Uttar Pradesh 
and Bengal. In Uttar Pradesh, while Sir Sayyid Ahmed Khan of the Aligarh 
movement wanted the Muslims to follow Western education and gain 
equality in the sphere with the Hindus, the founder of Deoband School 
wanted Islam to be purged of its supposedly impure accretions from local 
practices, and thereby resist from cultural onslaught of colonialism… Both 
cases were ashraf initiatives, but they were able to convince many poorer 
Muslims of the need to forge a separate Muslim identity. In Bengal the 
movement for purifying Islam and properly Islamicizing the illiterate 
Muslims masses in difficult terrain… was conducted by itinerant preachers 
movement among the peasantry... Faced with the rise of a Congress-led 
nationalism under mostly Hindu leadership, the colonial rulers began to 
favour Muslim separatist tendencies… In the case of Bengal, the background 
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of later success of the movement for partition of the country owed much to 
the discontent of the impoverished Muslim peasantry who saw mostly Hindu 
zamindars as their main enemy… The rise of Hindu fundamentalism, for 
example, expressed in the so-called cow protection movement… (Bagchi, 
2010: XXI). 
Cow protection issue was often raised by the Hindu landlords and merchants in 
order to undermine poor peasants and tenants demand for better land rights.  
It would be unfair to simply place all the blame for religious violence on British 
colonial rulers. However, divisions between Hindus and Muslims were aggravated 
during the colonial period when Muslims constituted about 25% of India’s 
population. During the 1930s, difficulties arose regarding how to share political 
power in provincial governments and government jobs between Hindus and 
Muslims. This could not be resolved to the satisfaction of these two communities 
and as a result differences and tensions between the two communities widened. 
Religious issues such as cow slaughter and playing music in front of mosques 
became important conflict issues. This was deliberately done by the Hindu 
extremists to antagonise Muslims. (Engineer, 1995; Chandra, 1984) 
The anti-colonial movement was massive in terms of popular participation, in 
the hopes of a more egalitarian society, but in practice did not go far enough to 
resolve caste and class contradictions. Instead it found it convenient to mobilise 
people on the basis of caste and religious identities. Episodes of religious violence 
were not witnessed in the pre-colonial period in India, only during British rule, and 
their intensity increased during partition in 1947. Moreover, the colonial 
government manipulated religious sentiments to their own advantage, as Chandra 
(1984) notes:  
Communalism was an expression of and deeply rooted in the interests, 
aspirations, outlook and attitude and psychology and point of view of the 
middle classes in a social situation characterised by economic stagnation and 
the absence of a vigorous struggle to transform society–the communal 
question was a petty bourgeois question par excellence. (Chandra, 1984:40-
41) 
After India had been occupied, the British colonial rulers introduced three major 
changes in the land revenue policy of the earlier rulers such AlauddinKhiljee and 
Emperor Akbar. Under the Mughal rulers, if a peasant had access to, say, 100 acres 
but only cultivated only 50 acres, he was then only asked to pay revenue on the 
actual amount cultivated i.e. 50 acres. However, the British colonial rulers 
drastically changed the basis of levying revenue from the land cultivated to the 
land owned. Under the British, peasants had to pay for the entire 100 acres of land, 
whether it is cultivated or not, and revenue was collected on the basis of land 
owned (Bagchi, 2010).  
Another difference witnessed was that under the Mughal system, revenue was 
collected from the peasantry after the crop was harvested, but whereas the British 
changed this to before the harvest, which meant that peasants were forced to 
borrow money in order to pay their rent. By introducing these changes the British 
were able to raise revenue, but indebtedness among the peasantry increased. 
Another major policy change which occurred was that under the Mughals, 
concessions were available in the case of crop failure, but the British discontinued 
such practices. In addition the Mughals re-invested some part of the collected 
revenue in the community, but under the British the entire revenue was either used 
to finance colonial wars taking place elsewhere or was repatriated to Britain 
(Bagchi, 2010). As a result impoverishment increased, leading to increased inter-
religious rivalry among people.  
During the Mughal period, only peasants could acquire the land of another 
peasant. But this practice was changed by the British, who allowed anyone who 
had the money to do so to buy land and displace peasants. As a result, due to rising 
indebtedness, large amounts of land passed into the hands of money lenders and 
traders. Later on de-industrialisation took place in India, which led to the de-
urbanisation of India’s cities and as a result of India’s declining textile exports, the 
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urban population moved to the villages and thus agriculture was overburdened 
(Siddiqui, 1990). Moreover, the British colonial government played an important 
role in promoting sectarian consciousness and communalism in order to ‘divide 
and rule’, especially after the 1857 Mutiny. Then the colonial government began 
dealing with the two communities i.e. Hindus and Muslims separately. Hasan 
(1982:26) notes: ‚The introduction of separate electorates was one of such favours. 
It was also seen as a counterpoise to the growing strength of the anti-colonial 
movement. The principle of communal representation inevitably leads to the 
creation of political camps organised against each other and teaches men to think 
as partisans and not citizens‛. 
British rule had proved to be oppressive for both Hindus and Muslims. 
Moreover, British colonialism had impacted on Indian people in various ways. For 
instance the poverty, misery and indebtedness of the peasantry were increased. 
Dadabhai Naoroji estimated and examined the causes of poverty in the last decade 
of the 19th century in India. His findings were used by Indian nationalist leaders as 
an economic critique of British rule in India. Naoroji attempted to demonstrate 
statistically that poverty of India was attributed to specific imperial institutions and 
policies (Siddiqui, 1990). Summarising Naoroji’s conclusions, Sarkar (2008:433-
434) argues that this ‘drain of wealth’ to Britain was the result of the ‚remittances 
of government funds and profits of private British capitalists, excessive revenue 
pressures, an alleged destruction of indigenous handicrafts, hindrances to nascent 
Indian industries etc.‛ 
Moreover, the publication of Dadabhai Naoroji’s work provided the logical 
explanation for India’s mass poverty to the anti-colonial movement in the early 20th 
century. Later, a number of studies by scholars known as the ‘economic 
nationalists’, such as R.C. Dutt, G.V. Joshi, and others presented a critique colonial 
rule by exposing the scale and mechanism of British colonial exploitation 
(Siddiqui, 2014a). This exposure of imperial Britain’s exploitation naturally raised 
the question of an alternative economic model for India which the early nationalists 
largely failed to provide. But the freedom movement needed to embrace all 
sections of society and their opinions. Since the majority of the people relied upon 
land for their livelihood, as the leader of independent movement, the Congress 
Party adopted a specific policy towards questions of land and labour, in its Karachi 
Resolution in 1931, supporting land and tenancy reforms, state control of major 
industries and labour rights. As a result, Indian nationalism was boosted and 
Congress Party was transformed into a mass party, in which all classes of people 
could feel that they had a share.  
Economic relationships of this type began with the European onslaught on the 
peoples of the Americas, Africa and Asia led by Columbus and Vasco da Gama at 
the end of the 15th century. In South Asia, colonialism began with the East India 
Company’s victory at Plassey in 1757. A war of independence and large-scale 
resistance began in East India and in Delhi, but the opposition to foreign 
occupation still remained regional in India, and even in 1857, more than half the 
country continued to be unaffected and did not take part at that time in the first war 
of independence. It now seems lack of participation by the masses was mainly due 
to poor organization and coordination at the regional level. Nearly half a century 
later, the frequent occurrence of famines and starvation followed by World War I 
and the Great Depression led to the deepening imperialist crisis extending to 
colonies like India (Bagchi, 2010). 
It seems useful to briefly discuss the development of modern businesses in 
India, especially in the 20th century. Indian businesses are embodiments of pre-
industrial forms of capital accumulation through money lending and trading. 
During the two World Wars and the Great Depression they had more freedom in 
the sense of setting up industries and had capital accumulation including black 
marketing and swindling in government contracts. British interests were more 
diverted towards railways, engineering, jute and tea plantations (Tyabji, 2015). 
Levkovsky (1966) also argues that development of businesses in India under 
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British rule was very different from that in West European countries. Unlike in 
Western Europe, in India, the emergence of industries did not follow a transition 
from independent artisans to manually operated manufacturers to modern power-
driven factories. In India, manufacturers were closely linked with the merchants’ 
and usurers’ capital. For a relatively long period, manufacturers continued to 
engage in money lending and trading along with industrial operations (Levkovsky, 
1966). 
In fact, merchant and usury capital and industrial capital are distinct forms of 
capital that employ different methods of accumulation. Merchant capital generates 
profits through buying and selling commodities, usury capital makes profits 
through the interest on loans advanced by money lenders, while industrial capital 
on the other hand makes profits by buying raw materials and employing workers 
and producing manufactured products and innovations of new products. In the 
West European countries, with the expansion of industries the importance of 
industrial capital increased over time, while the merchant capital operation 
declined relatively. The usury role also declined over time with the decline of 
peasant-based agriculture. However, contrary to this, in India it did not happen, as 
Tyabji (2015) observed: 
The existence of a class of businessmen does not automatically mean the 
existence of a group of industrially oriented entrepreneurs, because the 
development of industries is not necessarily the only money-making activity 
available to these businessmen… In the Indian case, colonialism and 
‘arrested development’ formed the context within which emerged the group 
of businessmen responsible for managing industrial ventures after 
independence. They were part of an imperfectly formed group of 
industrialists possessing characteristics that reflected their background of 
engagement in non-industrial activities; activities which they continued to be 
involved, even as they acquired control over industrial companies (Tyabji, 
2015:102). 
 
4. The Ideology and Philosophy of the RSS 
The RSS was founded by K.B. Hedgewar in Nagpur in 1925 and B.S. Moonje 
was also among its founder (Noorani, 2000). All founders of the RSS were from 
the Brahmin castes of the Maharashtra. It is very interesting to mention here that in 
mid-1920 in Nagpur town a minor conflict took place between Muslims and 
Hindus due to the playing of loud music in front of a mosque. On this incident, 
Hedgewar and Moonje, who were both member of Hindu Mahasbha, actively 
participated and held protests on this issue. This is how the incident was described 
in Hedgewar’s biography: 
Because of the in-built fear of Muslims among the Hindus, the band troupes 
sometimes shirked to play before the mosque. On such occasions Hedgewar 
himself would take over the drums and rouse the dormant manliness of 
Hindus (Despande & Ramswamy, 1981:71 cited in Bhatt, 2001:117). 
Hindu Mahasabha (hence Mahasabha) is another rabid anti-Muslim organisation 
which has been working closely with the RSS. V.D. Savarkar was the president of 
the Mahasabha in 1937-42. He tried to define nationalism on the basis of identity 
through stigmatisation and ‘threatening others’. Savarkar, the icon of ‘Hindutva’, 
wrote clemency letters to the British colonial authorities from Andamans. The RSS 
is firmly established as an anti-minorities political group viewing the Muslim 
community in particular as ‘threatening others’. According to him, Hindutva rests 
on three attributes: namely, geographical unity, racial features and common 
culture. His social and cultural characteristics stemmed from the mythical 
reconstruction of the so-called Vedic Golden Age. Savarkar wanted to see Muslims 
and Christian living in India as subordinates as according to him they represented 
‘others’, who had converted few generations ago and he suggested they should be 
made to convert back to Hinduism (Savarkar, 1989). 
Members of Mahasbha began as a pressure group within the Congress party. As 
a result of differences, its members were excluded from the Congress party in 1937 
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on accounts of communalist activities, but some important Mahasabha leaders 
continued to be part of Congress Party as Madan Mohan Malviyaalso happened to 
be the founder of Banaras Hindu University. P. Tandon, who was the leader of the 
Congress Party in UP state, openly opposed to providing any recognition or 
preservation of a specificallyMuslim Indian identity. He said: 
They [Muslim] should accept Indian culture. One culture and one language 
will pave the way for real unity. Urdu symbolises a foreign culture. Hindi 
alone can be the unifying factor for the diverse forces in the country 
(National Herald, 15th June, 1948, p.7, cited in Jaffrelot, 1996:97). 
Savarkar’s ideas on religious minorities initially influenced the RSS. On 
Hindus, Savarkar (1989) argues: 
Hindus are bound together not only by the ties of the love we to bear for a 
common fatherland and by common blood […] but also by the tie of the 
common homage we pay to our great civilisation – our Hindu culture, […] 
language, Sanskrit, which has been the chosen means of expression and 
preservation of that culture, of all that was best and worth-preserving in the 
history of our race. (Savarkar, 1989: 92) 
According to Savarkar (1939), Muslims and Christians are not part of his 
concept of ‘nation’ because of their cultural differences.  
Their [Muslims and Christians] holy land is far off in Arabia and Palestine. 
Their mythology and Prophets Ideas and heroes are not the children of this soil. 
Consequently their names and their outlook smack of foreign origin.‛ (Savarkar, 
1989:113) When Savarkar took over as president of the Hindu Mahasbha, further 
close cooperation were developed between the two organisations i.e. RSS and 
Mahasbha. Even before him from 1926 to 1931 Hedgewar had been secretary of 
the Hindu Mahasbha. In 1939 at the 21st session of the Hindu Mahasbha, Savarkar 
compared the Muslim question in India with the Jewish ‘problem’ in Germany: 
‚…the Muslims are on the whole more inclined to identify themselves and their 
interests with Muslims outside India than Hindus who live next door, like Jews in 
Germany (Bombay Chronicle, 29 December 1939, cited in Casolari, 2000:224). 
Golwalkar took over leadership of the RSS in 1940 and remained head of the 
organisation until his death some three decades later. Golwalkar said that only one 
‘race’ (i.e. Hindus) constituted the nation in India. Golwalkar’s book was published 
before the Muslim League Lahore Resolution (1940) in acceptance of two-nation 
theory (Golwalkar, 1939). He always emphasised that Hindus alone, as the 
privileged community in India, should rule the country. He did not approve of 
democracy which he thought of as being alien to the Hindu ethos and extolled the 
code of Manu, whom he admires ‘as the first greatest and the wisest law giver of 
mankind’. On the question of non-Hindus, Golwalkar declared:  
The non-Hindu in Hindustan must either adopt the Hindu religion […] or 
may stay in the country wholly subordinate to the Hindu nation claiming 
nothing, deserving no privileges, far less any preferential treatment, not even 
citizen’s rights‛. According to him: ‚in Hindustan exists and must need to 
exist [sic] the ancient Hindu nation and nothing else but the Hindu nation. All 
those not belonging to the national, i.e. Hindu race, religion, culture and 
language, naturally beyond the pale of real ‘National’ life… so long, 
however, as they maintain their racial, religion and cultural differences, they 
[minorities] cannot but be only foreigners. (Golwalkar, 1939:45-46) 
Furthermore, the British colonial officials never considered the RSS to be 
working against their interests. Neither Hedgewar nor Golwalkar joined the anti-
colonial movement, opting instead in favour of ‘character building’ tasks. (Bhatt, 
2001; Anderson & Shridhar, 1987) Also L.K. Advani, leader of the BJP, narrates:  
I joined [RSS] about the same time [1942] as the ‘quit India’ movement. I 
joined a couple of months earlier but my motivation was the conviction that 
India would neverattain independence by the methods the Congress was 
commanding. Much more was needed and the RSS approach used to be that 
unless we first build, form a nucleus of people willing to sacrifice their life 
for the country India would not become independent. (Interview with Advani 
on 11 February 1994, cited in Jafferlot, 1996:72) 
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Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy in the 1930’s inspired the RSS leaders 
especially their dream to build an authoritarian and disciplined organisation as the 
Nazis had done. While supporting Nazi Germany for racial purity and national 
building, Golwalkar (1939) said: 
To keep up the purity of the race and its culture, Germany shocked the world 
by her purging their country of the Semitic race – the Jews. Race pride is its 
highest has been manifested here. Germany has shown how well-nigh 
impossible it is for the races and cultures, having differences going to the 
root, to be assimilated into one united whole, a good lesson for us, in 
Hindustan to learn and profit by (Golwalkar. 1939:37). 
Golwalkar was strongly influenced by J.K Bluntschili’s works namely the 
theory of the state. Bluntschili argues that there is an advantage to having one 
single nationality:  
The contacts between fascism and Hindu Nationalism were the attempt to 
militarise Hindu society and to create a militant Hindu mentality among 
Hindus […]. At an ideological level, the most meaningful effect of the fascist 
influence is represented by the way in which Hindu nationalism developed its 
own concept of diversity, transforming ‘diverse’ people into enemies. Of 
course, the concept of the internal enemy is already implicitly contained in 
Savarkar’s Hindutva. Nevertheless, the continuous reference to German 
racial policy and the comparison of the Jewish problem in Germany with the 
Muslim question in India reveals the evolution of the concept of the ‘internal 
enemy’ along explicitly fascist lines (Casolari, 2000:227). 
There is clear evidence that the Hindu extremist organisations had links with the 
fascist parties in Europe (Casolari, 2000). B.S. Moonje visited Italy in 1930, where 
he met Mussolini; other Mahasbha leaders such as S.P. Mookerjee also established 
contact with Italian academic institutions. The RSS leader Golwalkar himself used 
the definition of nation put forward by German Nazi writer J.K. Bluntschili, 
namely:  
It is a union of masses of men of different occupation and social status, in a 
hereditary society of common spirit, feeling and race bound together 
especially by a language and customs in a common civilisation which gives 
them a sense of unity and distinction from all foreigners, quite apart from the 
bond of the state. (Golwalkar, 1939:19). 
On the question of authoritarian and secrecy within the RSS organisation Bhatt 
(2001) notes, 
The RSS organisation structures promote an authoritarian institutional 
secrecy that conceal the internal workings of the organisation and conflict 
and dissension within it, particularly conflict among its leaders … The RSS 
literature is also deeply imbued with a dense, carefully cultivated ideological 
language that inscribes its own political imaginary onto the realities it is 
ostensibly claiming to describe. One other factor relates to the RSS’s 
description of itself as a ‘non-political’ organisation, an appellation that has 
permeated relatively objective studies of the RSS… for not participating in 
the anti-colonial movement and the conditions related to the lifting of ban on 
the organisation in the immediate post-independence period… [Despite that] 
the RSS has not refrained from active political interventions from its 
inception (Bhatt, 2001:116). 
The RSS has always claimed that it is not a political but cultural and social 
organisation (Anderson & Shridhar, 1987). However, BJP leader and former Chief 
Minister of Uttar Pradesh state Kalyan Singh contradicted, the above claim and he 
said: ‚I have spent a greater part of my life in this organisation [RSS] and I can say 
the right from the distribution of election tickets [to candidates] in BJP to selecting 
cabinet ministers, it is only the RSS which calls the shots. What else is political 
activity?‛ (Noorani, 2000:12). 
Dictatorship, whether military or civilian, is one of the authoritarian forms of 
rule that seems to be necessary for capitalism at times when existing forms of rule 
either no longer sufficed or were seen not to suffice. Examining the rise of fascism 
in European, Rosenberg emphasises the popular base of fascism and that its social 
and ideological appeal had the support of state authority, helping it to rise to power. 
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The state even overlooked the open use of ‚Storm-troopers‛ by fascists. Rosenberg 
argues,  
The government and the ruling groups do not deploy the standard or regular 
state authorities against the opposition, but volunteer-corps are recruited from 
the mass of the population to handle this job […] The activities of the storm-
troopers of the fascist type are in complete violation of the laws. Legally the 
storm-troopers should be tried and sentenced to jail. But in fact nothing of the 
sort happens to them‛. (Rosenberg, cited in Desai, 2016: 22) 
Fascist ideologies had been incubating in society long before the Hitler 
emerged. As in Indian situation Desai notes: ‚This also means that fascist 
ideologies are not easily separated from the ideas and ideologies that normally 
characterise right-wing politics in an age of popular politics and here too, 
Hindutva’s similarity with fascism is clear‛. (Desai, 2016: 21) The Hindu 
Mahasabha merged with the RSS in 1931, which gave the organisation a much-
needed boost allowing it to spread into the Hindi-speaking states of the north. The 
RSS remained in the background. The Hindutva ideology of the RSS is based on an 
extreme communalist and sectarian ideology. As Christophe Jaffrelot (1996) 
detailed in his work on the Hindu nationalist movement, the RSS, in which Modi 
was a "pracharak" (i.e. activist), was built on the stigmatisation of "others". 
(Jaffrelot, 1996) 
We should not forget that in Italy, the fascist ideology emerged out of 
nationalism, when the capitalist class became dissatisfied with the ‚liberal‛ politics 
and extended its full support to an anti-liberal ideology based on authority, 
centralism and violence. All these resonate with the current Indian situation. 
Hindutva rejects ‚Enlightenment rationalism‛, singling out Muslims as ‚the enemy 
within‛ as happened with the BJP pogrom in Gujarat and other places in India, 
providing clear evidence of creeping fascism in India.  
 
5. Views on Historical Events 
The communalist and sectarian views on past historical events are defined by 
the RSS as true nationalism. It emphasises that India belongs to the majority 
community and has been formed by their history, religion and culture alone. Due to 
the differences with Mahatma Gandhi on these very issues Savarkar dismissed him 
as a ‘pseudo nationalist’ (Savarkar, 1989). The RSS uses religious consciousness to 
mobilise Hindus for their narrow political ends.  
Hindu communalist ideology is derived from historical and political 
assumptions and is thus unable to stand up to scrutiny on the basis of logic and 
rationality. Therefore, it is important to discuss some important historical facts. It is 
very important to understand history on the basis of facts, and a rational and logical 
explanation of history and any distortion of these facts may lead to wholly 
misunderstanding past events in India. Communalism in India draws its sustenance 
from a selective interpretation of history seeking to construct an ‘imagined’ past to 
support its views. As Panikkar (1997:73) explains, ‚The Hindu view highlights the 
glory of the ancient past and tries to appropriate its heritage, ignoring at the same 
time the rich contribution of the medieval period to the making of the composite 
culture of India.‛ Furthermore, on the notion of Hinduism as a homogeneous 
religion, Panikkar (1997) writes: 
Did Hinduism as a coherent religion exist from ancient times? The early 
sources indicate that it did not; it was encompassed in a series of parallel 
systems, consisting of a large number of independent sects. These sects did 
not have a single source of origin. […] The historicity of Hinduism is a 
relatively recent construction, undertaken in the 19th century as a part of 
reformist-revivalist movements. (Panikkar, 1997: 73-74) 
Similar points have been made by Romila Thapar. According to her, Hinduism 
has been practised in many ways, and the consolidation of this religion occurred 
after the Christian missionaries came to India, and Hindu reform movements began 
to consolidate against new challenges and tried to unify Hindus into one 
community (Thapar, 1989). 
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Hindu extremists have been misleading the people on the issue of beef eating. 
They choose to forget that beef eating was common in ancient India, as Swami 
Vivekananda said on 2nd February 1900 in his talk on ‘Buddhist India’ in 
California, USA that ‘Hindus on ceremonial and special occasions sacrificed bull 
and ate it. Beef eating was common among Aryans, during the Vedic period’. On 
the question of beef eating Manusmriti (Hindu religious book) in Chapter V 
provides details of different kinds of animals to be consumed. B.R. Ambedkar 
wrote a paper titled ‘Did the Hindus Never Eat Beef?’ where he quoted from the 
ancient Hindu scriptures that beef eating was prevalent in ancient India or Vedic 
India. Ambedkar concludes that ‚the Aryans of the Rig Veda did kill cows for 
purposes of food and ate beef‛.This is abundantly clear from the Rig Veda itself, as 
Rig Veda (X.91.14) narrates that ‚sacrificed horses, bulls, oxen, barren cows and 
rams…[were] killed with a sword or axe‛ (Ambedkar, 1990:323). 
The RSS assumes that Hindu culture and Indian nationalism is Hindu 
nationalism. The selective approach to looking at the past and only taking into 
consideration the Hindu experience denies the composite culture and traditions of 
India. Therefore, the RSS’s interpretation of India’s past is incorrect. Such an 
approach ignores the complex historical processes by which composite culture 
developed in India. Cultural development must embrace various sources which 
have come from different religions such as Buddhism and Jainism and also from 
religious influences which came from outside such as Islam and Christianity. As 
Panikkar emphasises that, ‚Whether India developed as a melting pot of cultures or 
only remained a salad bowl is no more the issue. The crucial question is whether 
Indian culture is conceived as a static phenomenon, tracing its identity to a single 
unchanging source, or a dynamic phenomenon, critically and creatively 
interrogating all that is new‛ (K.N. Panikkar cited by Hamid Ansari, 2016). 
Looking at India’s history through the religion of its rulers emerged during the 
British colonial period, when for the first time James Mill divided Indian history 
into three periods: the Hindu, the Muslim and the British. Such interpretations 
suited British colonial rulers, who were keen to hold on their power on the basis of 
‘divide and rule’. Commenting on British colonial historiography, Harbans Mukhia 
notes:  
History driven solely by the ruler’s religious identity was the most significant 
change colonial historiography affected to the multifaceted explorations of 
the discipline in ancient and medieval India. Historical time, before that, was 
unfamiliar with the famous tripartite division of Hindu-Muslim-British 
periods introduced by James Mill’s in 1818; some decades later, Elliot and 
Downson, in their massive eight-volume History of India as told by its own 
Historians, reinforced the deadly effect of this scheme. The intent of the 
effort was never concealed: ‚To teach the bombastic babus the great relief 
British rule had brought them from the tyranny of the Muslim rulers‛ - this 
was divide and rule in its perfect form (Mukhia, 2016). 
The religious-centred interpretation of history is wrong. To communalise 
historical events and characterise ruling class wars as religious strife is absolutely 
false. For example, the battle between Emperor Akbar and Maharana Pratap was 
purely for political power. There was no strictly religious division in the struggle, 
as both sides had the support of both Muslims and Hindus. The Rajput Hindu elites 
supported EmperorAkbar for territorial and political expansion. Similarly the battle 
between the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb and Shivaji and that between Tipu Sultan 
and Malabar local elites were the same; these were never considered religious 
wars. As Panikkar (1997) observes:  
The Raja of Amber [who was a Hindu Rajput] sided with [Mughal emperor] 
Akbar against Maharana Pratap. Sultan Mahmud Lodi and Hasan Khan 
Mewati assisted Rana Sanga against Babur; and the Sultan of Jaunpur joined 
forces with a Hindu chieftain to fight against the Muslim rulers of Kapila. 
The history of India abounds with such examples. It should be obvious that 
medieval monarchs were influenced more by political compulsions than by 
religious considerations (Panikkar, 1997:75). 
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It can be argued that this was the result of false information circulated by the 
East India Company officials and their supporters in their writings, paintings, and 
cartoons created war-like situation from 1780 to 1799. Kate Brittlebank found that 
Tipu’s expansionist military strategy towards Kodavas and the Mangalore was 
largely due to their support for Britain as he was trying to weaken pro-British 
forces bordering the Mysore kingdom (Thapar, 2013). 
The proponents of communalism argue that the entire medieval period of Indian 
history was dominated by the endless violence between Hindus and Muslims, a 
‚civilizational clash‛, meaning that little scope for mutual adjustment and 
tolerance. The Hindu communal interpretations were rejected by Mahatma Gandhi, 
J.N. Nehru and Maulana A. K. Azad, who saw Hindu-Muslim unity as so very 
essential for India’s future. The communalists rejected Emperor Akbar’s policy 
reconciliation i.e. ‘sulh-i-kul’ between the religious communities and simply 
portrayed him as foreign invader. They ignore any attempt of cultural 
rapprochement or even cordial interaction between the two communities. They rely 
on Elliot, a British academic, who deliberately wrote about Hindu-Muslim divide 
in Medieval India. Commenting on distortions of history, Iqtidar Alam Khan 
(2001) noted: 
These vulgarized versions of communal interpretation are being disseminated 
aggressively through text-books and mass media all over the subcontinent. 
Total divorce from a critical reading of the source material and an attitude of 
hatred between communities are the two distinctive features of these versions 
which place them decisively beyond the pale of academic arguments. In 
contrast to communalists interpretations, in fact, during the medieval period 
Hindu-Muslim relations were harmonious, not ones of strife and 
confrontation, as claimed by the Hindu extremists. Both communities lived 
together peacefully without inter-community violence and bitterness. The 
integration between the two communities can be seen on the tombs of the 
Sufis i.e. khanqas. The Sufis provided a means of incorporating Hindu 
religious customs and beliefs into their mass prayers. However, such positive 
messages and practices have been conveniently ignored by the RSS and its 
affiliated organisations (Khan, 2001:18). 
The RSS claims that in 1528 the Mughal King Babur destroyed a Hindu temple 
to build a mosque. This was based on a mythical story without any archaeological 
evidence to support the existence of a temple on the site of the Babri mosque. In 
1949 after an idol of Ram was placed in the mosque, the district authorities found 
that some local Hindu extremists had been responsible. Soon after, the District 
Magistrate K.K. Nair was told by the provincial government to remove the idol. 
Nair ignored the government order leaving the administration shortly after to join 
the RSS. He was later elected in to the state legislative assembly on the BJP ticket 
(Gopal, 1991). 
However, there is no mention in any historical text from that period of the 
destruction of a Hindu temple. For example, Abu Fazal in his book Ain-i-Akbari 
did not mention of any destruction of a temple of Ram at Ayodhya. Tulsidas the 
well-known devotee of Lord Ram and author of the holy book Ramayana, who 
lived during the Babur period, did not mention any such incident. It mentioned for 
first time by P. Carnegy, a colonial administrator, in his book in 1870. His main 
source was a local Hindu priest, who told him about the construction of Babri 
mosque on the temple of Ram. A few years later, this story was again narrated by 
another colonial district administrator H.R. Neville, whose source was Carnegy 
(Gopal, 1991). 
Sarkar (1999) suggests that RSS claims of peaceful ancient Hindu rulers are far 
from historically accurate. Commenting on the so-called peaceful expansion, 
Sarkar (1999) observes:  
Brahminical Hindu rituals, beliefs and caste disciplines have spread across 
the sub-continent and penetrated and sought to transform communities with 
initially very different practices and faiths. It has somehow become 
conventional to describe the processes here by anodyne terms like 
‘Sanskritisation’ or ‘cultural integration’ but they really amount nevertheless 
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what with other religious traditions would have been termed ‘conversion 
(Sarkar, 1999:1693). 
Lack of unity amongst Hindus has been highlighted, as according to Dube 
(1965):  
[Hindu religious textbooks] provide not one model but many models of 
Hindu religion […] what we call Hindu philosophy is not just one school of 
thought, it is compendium of many systems of thought, recognising and 
advocating many divergent images of society and many different schemes of 
values (Dube, 1965:423). 
There is rather a constant effort at identification with religious community, as 
well as, for Hindu majoritarian communalists, with nationalism. Consider for 
instance the very term ‘Hindutva’, which literally means no more than ‘Hindu-
ness’, but has come to be a self-description, from the mid-1920s onwards, of a 
much more specific and narrow ideology. According to R.S. Sharma (1990):  
The advent of such religions as Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam helped to 
reform and reorganise society and economy on healthier lines… But it has to 
be understood that every religion is the product of a certain type of social 
milieu […] Buddhism emphasis on the protection of all beings in general and 
the cows in particular helped to promote agriculture (Sharma, 1990:3-4). 
On the issue of plundering Hindu temples, Sharma emphasises that the causes 
of such actions must be explained. He further says:  
In general the temples were relatively far wealthier than the mosques. In the 
early 11th century the Somnath temple had 500 devadasis, 300 barbers and 
numerous priests. It was endowed with as many as 10,000 villages. […] It is 
because of accumulation of wealth in the temples that some Hindu rulers 
appointed special officers for destroying idols made of precious metal and 
seizing wealth for the treasury. Such was the case with Harsha who ruled in 
Kashmir at the end of the 11th century, and had appointed an officer whose 
function was concerned with that of uprooting of idols (devotpatana). The 
appointment of such officers and the measures recommended in the 
Arthashastra of Kautilya to raise money from the credulous people by 
superstitious devices will dispel the idea that members of the Hindu ruling 
class have been consistently tolerant towards their subjects (Sharma, 1990:8). 
On the question of religious tolerance Kosambi argues that attitudes towards 
religious tolerance or otherwise in both ancient and medieval India were to a 
certain extent related to the availability of resources. A tolerant or eclectic attitude 
would become pronounced during a period of comparative prosperity but it would 
tend to recede into the background in a situation of scarcity and fall in revenues. As 
Kosambi (1962:29) observes, ‚With the Mughal prosperity at its height emperor 
Akbar could dream of a synthetic Din-i-Ilahi; Aurangzeb could only augment his 
falling revenues by increased religious persecution in the Jizya tax on unbelievers‛.  
In the Mughal period, tolerance was seen to a prudent policy of governance and 
under the umbrella of Sulh-i-Kul, i.e. ‘absolute peace’. Emperor Akbar’s court is 
known for the navratna (nine gems), the nine courtiers of extraordinary talent 
assembled independent of their religion or caste. It was proclaimed that the King, 
like God, must favour all without discrimination. Under the Emperor Akbar the 
concept that state should not make the distinction between the subjects on the 
ground of their religion and it was not linked to loyalty. No special favour was 
given to any specific religion, the concept of Sulh-i-kul, which meant that all 
religion were roads one God. The policy of the state as institution was kept above 
to be seen as favouring to specific religion. This was a clear indication that the state 
presented itself as modern and secular and no special favours were granted to any 
one religion. Emperor Akbar considered himself to be the ruler of all, not just 
Muslims. Dara Shukoh’s (Shahjahan’s eldest son) fascination for the Upanishads 
and the Bhagvad Gita is well known.  
Mughal emperors had Hindu generals in their army and as advisors. Among the 
nine distinguished advisors of the Mughal emperor Akbar, most were Hindus 
(Chandra, 1984; Kosambi, 1962). Not only Emperor Akbar but even Aurangzeb 
used it to win Rajput support. Recent research shows that the Mughal Emperor 
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Aurangzeb had issued jagirs and cash gifts for the maintenance of famous temples, 
namely, Someshwar Nath Mahadevtemple located at Allahabad; Mahakaleshwara 
temple situated at Ujjain; Balajitemple at Chitrakut; Umanandatemple at Gauhati; 
the Jain temple of Shatrunjal; and other temples and gurudwaras scattered over 
northern India  Pande (2006). found that Aurangzeb ordered destruction of temples 
and mosques, for example, the Vishvanathtemple at Varanasi and the mosque at 
Golkunda. The reasons have to be examined in proper historical perspective. The 
temple had become the centre of conspiracy against the state and similarly with the 
mosque. Pande concluded that Aurangzeb had ordered to raid the temple to rescue 
women members of the family of a Minister of Rajasthan who had gone there on 
pilgrimage (Pande, 2006). 
In Golkunda state, for example, a Muslim ruler, after collecting revenue of the 
state, did not pay his dues to the Imperial Authority at Delhi. He had buried wealth 
(gold and silver) and erected a Mosque over it. When Emperor Aurangzeb came to 
know about it, he ordered the demolition of the mosque. Recent researchers have 
refuted the charge against Aurangzeb that he was an anti-Hindu monarch and 
established that Aurangzeb did not make any distinction between temples and 
mosques so far as state administration was concerned. The last of the Great 
Mughals, Aurangzeb, was a pragmatic ruler who patronised Hindu institutions and 
employed more Hindus in his imperial administration than his predecessors. 
(Panikkar et al., 2002; Pande, 2006). 
Emperor Aurangzeb inherited a large empire, but adopted a policy to extend it 
further to south, which put great strain on the resources of both men and materials. 
His objective of unifying the entire country under one central authority may be 
justified in theory, but in practice it was disastrous. Not only it meant neglect of the 
northern and western provinces but also undermining local autonomy and not 
accepting to the Maratha’s demand of greater regional autonomy led to further 
rebellion and discontent. When earlier Emperor Akbar was put to similar 
challenges, he conceded to allocating more powers to local chiefs and made 
alliances with Rajput chiefs. But Aurangzeb choose to crush the opponents and 
antagonise the former allies especially Rajputs weakened the empire and created a 
misunderstanding between Mughals and the Rajput elites, whose earlier military 
support was seen as one among the major factor of their past military successes. In 
fact, the Mughal rule in the periods of Akbar, Jahangir and Shahjahan were 
adhered to secular laws and rules to govern the country. There was never any 
incidence where the rulers used military forces against other religions, including 
Hindu. The stability was based on the non-interference with the people’s religious 
beliefs and customs, and encouraging the friendly relations between various 
religious communities in India. Hindu chiefs were assigned key military posts and 
were accorded highest honours and their alliance with the Hindu Rajputs chiefs 
was visible manifestation of such policy. However, when Aurangzeb imposed 
jizyah (tax on Hindus) in 1679, it was seen as turning point in the history of 
Mughal rule in India. The peace and integration between religious communities 
continued and no animosity was observed, but such measures encouraged bigotry. 
Jizyah was a meaningless gesture and even it was opposed by the powerful section 
of the nobility including the emperors’ sister Jahanara Begum. Shortly after the 
death of Aurangzeb’s death jizyah was abolished. This method to collect extra 
revenue of the basis of religion is highly discriminatory and it harassed and 
alienated certain sections of Hindu, especially the merchants and financiers 
(Truschke, 2017; Khan, 2001). 
The BJP state government in Rajasthan is trying to falsify historical events. For 
example, it has introduced books in state higher education institutions that portray 
Rana Pratap as having defeated Emperor Akbar at the Battle of Haldighati on June 
18, 1576. This has sparked a controversy since the Hindutva, including the RSS, is 
portraying this battle as a Hindu-Muslim conflict, which was not the case since 
both armies were composed of a mix of Hindu and Muslim soldiers (Mander, 
2016). While Islam Khan Sur, a descendant of Sher Shah Suri, and his contingent 
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supported the ruler of Mewar, Emperor Akbar’s army was led by Raja Man Singh 
of Amber. The Mughals were also helped by Shakti Singh, the brother of Rana 
Pratap. There is no evidence that Rana Pratap won the Battle of Haldighati and 
those who are now hailing him as a Hindu hero are repeating the British colonial 
administration’s erroneous portrayal of medieval India as an unending conflict 
between Muslims and Hindus (Thapar, 2013). 
The Mughal emperor, Akbar, who reigned from 1556 to 1605, was sympathetic 
towards Hindu culture and philosophy and he regularly engaged in debates with 
Hindu and Jain religious scholars. He attempted to establish a synthesis religion 
and wanted all religions to be respected. Emperor Akbar promoted intellectuals, 
musicians and religious scholars on a totally non-sectarian basis. Dara Shikoh, the 
son of Emperor Shahjahan, had a deep interest in Hindu philosophy, financially 
supporting the translation of the Upanishads into Persian. 
In sharp contrast to the view propagated by the Hindutva organizations that 
India suffered 800 years of ‘foreign rule’. The reality is that this was not the rule of 
one country over another. Muslim rulers settled down and married in India and 
made it their home. This was not the case under colonial rule when a large 
proportion of the nation’s wealth was appropriated by the British rulers and 
transferred to the foreign country as a tribute. Moreover, India’s markets and its 
economy were transformed to suit the occupiers’ own national interests.  
They ignore the fact that the Afghans and Mughals settled in India, intermarried 
locally (with Rajputs, for example), and invested their wealth back into India. In 
this respect, they were unlike the British who did not settle down in India or 
consider it to be their home country. The latter colonised India and transformed its 
economy to favour British merchants and industrialists, draining its wealth to 
support their own development of capitalism and industrialisation. During the 
British colonial period, famines were common and Indian industries were 
destroyed and it became a market for British manufactured products, 
impoverishing India. It is widely agreed among economic historians that in the 
immediate pre-colonial period India and China were the world’s leading economies 
(Siddiqui, 2015a). 
Despite the claims of the RSS that Muslim rulers’ allegiance was to the holy 
city of Mecca, not a single Mughal ruler or their children or any other members of 
their families ever went there to perform Haj. They were close to Sufi shrines in 
India and often visited Sufi saints. In fact, most of these Sufi saints are highly 
revered by both Muslims and Hindus in India and have a common history, too. The 
RSS wrongly claims that Indian Muslims consider that ‚their holy land is far off in 
Arabia and Palestine‛. In fact, even Mughal rulers were influenced by Sufism. 
None of the Sufi saints went to Mecca or Medina and Sultans and the Mughals 
including Emperor Aurangzeb did not go to Mecca or Medina. Instead they 
frequently visited dargahs (tombs of saints) such as MuinddinChisti in Ajmer, 
Nizamuddin Aulia in Delhi, Salim SeikhChisti in FatehpurSikri and they saw local 
Sufi saints as the protectors of their territory.  
It is well documented that Emperor Aurangzeb donated several large plots of 
land to Brahmins in Varanasi for temples but this is not mentioned by the RSS 
leaders. The fact that the provincial ruler in Ayodhya, Nawab Safdar Jung (1739-
1754), gave a grant to build Hanumagrahi temple is also conveniently ignored by 
the RSS, as it does not fit their mythical discourse in which Muslim rulers are 
always framed as oppressive. 
The RSS is trying to revise school textbooks and to portray Muslim rulers as 
destroyers of Hindu temples, undermining the Islamic contribution to Indian 
history. They ignore Sri Aurobindo, the Hindu religious leader, who had very 
different view about Muslim rule in India. According to him, 
[Muslim] domination ceased very rapidly to be a foreign rule […] The 
Mughal Empire was a great and magnificent construction and an immense 
amount of political genius and talent was employed in its creation and 
maintenance. It was as splendid, powerful and beneficent and, it may be 
Journal of Economic and Social Thought 
JEST, 4(2), K. Siddiqui, p.142-186. 
165 
added, in spite of Aurangzeb’s fanatical zeal, infinitely more liberal and 
tolerant in religion than any medieval or contemporary European kingdom or 
empire […] (Sri Aurobindo, cited in Sen, 1993:16). 
The Mughal emperor Aurangzeb has been portrayed by Hindutva as attacking 
Hindus and destroying their temples, without any factual evidence. In contrast to 
this disinformation, Audrey Truschke (2017), who has carried out research for 
several years on this issue, argues that,  
Aurangzeb took actions that strike most modern people as abhorrent, such as 
destroying and desecrating select Hindu and Jain temples and reviving the 
jizya tax on most non-Muslims. But, alongside such actions, the king also 
protected most Hindu and Jain temples and increased the Hindu share in the 
Mughal nobility. Any historical legitimate explanation of Aurangzeb’s state 
activities must explain why he protected Hindu and Jain places of worship 
more frequently than he destroyed them. Communal hate does not get us very 
far in this project, and so I posit that other factors such as political reprisals 
and morality concerns were at play in Aurangzeb’s treatment of Hindu and 
Jain places of worship. Overall, Aurangzeb was far more driven by practical 
considerations of rule, the priorities of Mughal kingship, and a thirst for 
power, rather than hatred of Hindus (Truschke, 2017). 
Truschke’s book Culture of Encounters (2016) discusses the exchange between 
the Persian-speaking Mughal court and Sanskrit scholars. This all began with the 
invitation of Brahman and Jain intellectuals to Emperor Akbar's court in the 1560s, 
and a number of Hindu and other religious books were produced during the reigns 
of Akbar, Jahangir and Shahjahan. Important epics and historical texts were 
translated into Persian from Sanskrit, which certainly elevated the political position 
of the Brahman and Jain elites. On the basis of a substantial archive of Sanskrit 
materials, Truschke reveals a vibrantly multicultural Mughal court and refutes the 
RSS claim that Hindu culture was adversely affected by the advent of Muslim 
rulers including the Mughals (Truschke, 2016). Contrary to RSS claims, Truschke 
(2016) argues that Sanskrit language flourished at the Mughal court and that the 
Mughals favoured the promoting of diversity in India during their rule. For 
political reasons the RSS would like to erase the Mughals from Indian history. 
Commenting on the issue of Sanskrit during Aurangzeb’s reign, she points out that 
it is unfair to ignore the reasons for the later backlash against this language. The 
main reasons were the increasing use of Hindi, even under Shahjahan’s rule in the 
17th century and the fact that Aurangzeb came to power after defeating Dara 
Shikoh, who was known for his engagement in a series of cultural exchanges 
involving Sanskrit from 1640 until his death in 1659. Aurangzeb attempted to 
break from him and distinguish his rule from the previous heir apparent. Therefore, 
his decision seems to be more political than religious or cultural (Truschke, 2016). 
This raises the issue of how much violence during the Mughal period was 
motivated by religion. The answer appears to be none. The Mughals acted violently 
towards their political foes but all the evidence suggests that in pre-colonial India 
there was no religious violence as was commonly the case in pre-modern Europe. 
Accounts by European travellers and more recent works by historians have 
emphasised that religious tolerance was prevalent during that period in India 
(Truschke, 2016). 
India’s greatness lies in its diversity and not in some invented Hindu past. 
Romila Thapar (2013) argues that: 
The institutions that grow from religious associations are frequently 
mechanisms for gaining access to resources and power, encouraging the 
creation of dominant and subordinate communities, involving varying 
relationships of coexistence or confrontation. These situations of religious 
plurality remained characteristic of Indian society over many centuries. This 
was in part tied into the structure of caste society where caste clusters could 
define and adjust their religion to accord with social needs. (Thapar, 2013: 6) 
However, anti-colonial movements under the Congress Party had severe 
limitations. Its leaders were closely identified with narrow sectarian religious 
issues and were involved in cow protection societies and were also active in 
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sectarian religious societies such as Arya Samaj and Hindu Mahasabha. The 
Congress Party also used religious symbols and consciousness to mobilise the 
people. In Maharashtra its leader Tilak employed Shivaji to mobilise the people 
and in Uttar Pradesh and Bengal the traders and landlords who formed the 
leadership of the Congress Party, took an active part in campaigns against cow 
slaughter and also encouraged revivalist thinking and came out strongly in favour 
of a social system based on the principles of Hinduism. 
On 30th January 1948 Mahatma Gandhi was murdered by Nathuram Goodse, a 
former member of the RSS who nonetheless maintained very close links with the 
organisation. As Christophe Jaffrelot (2016) argues: 
Nathuram Godse’s family claims that he remained an RSS worker till the 
end. His brother Gopal declared in 1994, ‚You can say we grew up in the 
RSS… Nathuram had become a baudhikkaryavahak [intellectual worker] in 
the RSS. He said that he (Nathuram) left the RSS… because [M.S.] 
Golwalkar and the RSS were in a lot of trouble after Gandhi’s murder. But he 
did not leave the RSS […]. People like Godse are not just products of 
organisations, but also of the atmosphere created by the hate speeches by 
members of these organisations. Hate speeches against Gandhi were all 
pervasive in 1947-48 […] G.C. Narang, a Hindu Mahasabha leader from 
Punjab, Jugal Kishore Birla, another Mahasabha leader and the RSS leader 
M.S. Golwalkar. They denounced the government’s ‚satanic‛ attitude 
(Jaffrelot, 2016). 
After Gandhi’s assassination, India’s Home Minister Sardar Patel told the RSS 
leaders that in order to lift the ban on the RSS, they must have a written 
constitution, be committed to democratic procedures to renounce violence, and 
accept the constitution of India and the Indian flag (Jaffrelot, 1996). Patel wrote to 
S.P. Mookerjee on 18 July 1948: ‚As regards the RSS and the Hindu Mahasabha 
the case relating to Gandhiji’s murder is sub judice and I should not like to say 
anything about the participation of the two organisations, but our reports do 
confirm that, as a result of the activities of these two bodies, particularly the 
former, an atmosphere was created in the country in which such a ghastly tragedy 
became possible‛ (Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, vol. 6:323, cited in Noorani, 
2015; also see Noorani, 2016a). 
 
6. Secularism and Nationalism in India 
Secularism is a universal value, applicable to peoples of all religious affiliations 
that treat them equally, irrespective of their individual beliefs. The idea of 
secularism is the notion of separatism of private and public domains of religion and 
state. However, some values are not openly articulated and refer to personal 
behaviour in everyday life in one’s relationship with others, particularly with other 
religious groups. Other values are also very important including the right to 
practise one’s faith freely, to work, to feel safe and so on.  
Following independence, India chose a secular constitution with provisions for 
equality and safety for minorities. In the past, the existence of different religions, 
ethnic groups, languages and customs was welcomed and seen as a resource to 
build this commonality and never resented as a problem. The leader resisted the 
temptation of erasing differences to create oneness. As a country, it is inhabited by 
many different religious communities, and has a diverse range of languages and 
ethnic groups. It is very important to recognise the existence of this heterogeneous 
identity. Hinduism itself has a plural structure, not only due to its caste system but 
also to the various schools of thoughts and interpretations of this religion. In fact, 
defining Hinduism as a single religion is a comparatively recent development. The 
term ‘Hindu’ was originally applied by Persians and Greeks to a location, referring 
to those people who lived beyond the Indus River (Sen, 1993). 
Communalisation of Indian politics and society has been on the rise since the 
1990s, and public discourse is increasingly driven by prejudice and rumour rather 
than fact. It was believed that the government would protect minorities, and 
education and economic development would lead to the development of a secular 
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mind-set. This has proved to be a simplistic assumption. Although the word 
‘secular’ was inserted into the Constitution in 1975, secularism still remains an 
embattled ideal in India. More significantly, as illustrated above, the government 
has not just measurably failed in protecting the rights of minorities, but also has 
been complicit in the violence against them (Basu, 2015). 
The idea of a secular India, which is tolerant towards different religions, has 
been shaken by the rise of the Hindutva forces since the early 1990s. The extremist 
Hindu organisations are that have spearheaded mob violence in recent years have 
been demanding an end to Indian secularism, calling instead for the recognition of 
a Hindu state as defined by the founders of RSS (Brass, 2006b). They would like to 
see a radical departure from the idea of India as a modern secular, pluralist, and 
tolerant state among the community of nations, an idea that was central to the 
independence movement. In his prayer meeting held in Delhi on July 15, 1947, 
Mahatma Gandhi stated: ‚Hindus, Muslims, Parsis and Christians: all are Indian‛ 
(Alam, 2007). It is also clearly reflected in the constitutional and political structure 
of the country, despite its many weaknesses. 
During the parliamentary elections of 2013 that brought the BJP to power in 
India, the idea of secularism was debated vigorously. Religion is a private matter 
and secularism appears to imply the tolerance of differences. It also implies the 
primacy of civil laws, which should be based on equal rights, and the duties and 
obligations of all citizens of India. In progressive societies, secular values in 
government policies relating to employment, health, education, and social justice 
must be aimed at the well-being of all communities. Commenting on the practice of 
secularism in India, Paul Brass (2006b) notes:  
What is essential to understand in the Indian context is that all these 
fundamental values and practices are, in fact, denied to many, if not most 
people in everyday life in the country through caste discrimination, police 
misbehaviour and brutality and the consequences of extreme and grinding 
poverty. Moreover, they are often denied to whole categories of people, 
including caste and religious groups, particularly Muslims in post-
independence India […] But it is a contemporary fact in India that Muslims 
are discriminated against in most parts of the country in public employment, 
that their favoured language/script, Urdu, has been nearly eliminated from 
public instruction in north India, and they have suffered grievously in 
countless communal riots in which they have been attacked and killed by 
state police forces (Brass, 2006b:116). 
Secularism is directed to address and to remove the religious strife between 
religious communities. However, the RSS has always been opposed to progressive, 
secular, democratic systems based on pluralism and built on values like equality, 
and cultural diversity. For instance, in the 1950s it campaigned against the Hindu 
reform code bill, and in the 1990s on the issue of job reservations. It has steadfastly 
and enthusiastically endorsed Hindu chauvinism and upper Hindu caste hegemony. 
Minorities are permitted to live within such a social system but only as long as they 
remain submissive to Hindu nationalism (Alam, 2007). 
Hindutva organisations talk about ‚cultural nationalism‛ with its so-called 
‚Hindu interests‛ as defined by RSS. Their inaccurate interpretations of past events 
are driven by a right-wing religious agenda in an attempt to eliminate the 
composite (i.e. diverse) culture of India. The notion of ‚nationalism‛ is also 
important for communal organisation i.e. Hindutva. Their entire focus is to extend 
the arguments in support of Hindu Rastra (i.e. Hindu nation). Unlike Judaism, 
Christianity, and Islam, Hinduism has neither a ‚book‛ nor a ‚church‛. In fact, 
according to the well-known India historian Romila Thapar (2013), until 
recentlyEuropean and Arab travellers used to refer to the inhabitants of India as the 
‚Hindu group of religions‛. The RSS would like to establish a Hindu Rastra in 
India that would be both theocratic and also authoritarian, with a small clique 
determining state policy and also deciding who is a true Indian and who is not. 
For RSS, the anti-colonial movement and an independent India based on secular 
constitution was anathema. It was financed and supported by traders, merchants 
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and also the Maharajas of the princely states and stayed clear of any opposition to 
British rule. Its leaders openly supported the Hindu caste system which is central to 
institutionalised discrimination. For them, an anti-colonialist movement that 
organised people on the basis of universal franchise, equal rights and land reform 
was seen as surrendering to religious and ethnic minorities and for that reason, 
Mahatma Gandhi had to sacrifice his life. In fact, RSS stands for ‘counter-
revolution’ against democratic revolution (Brass, 2006a). 
Although it helped to create a strong opposition to British rule it faced hostility 
from within, especially from the advocates of the ‚two-nation‛ theory based on 
religious identity, led by V.D. Savarkar and M.A. Jinnah. India was partitioned into 
two nations i.e. Hindu and Muslim. In his book Modern India, Bipan Chandra 
points out,  
On 15 August 1947, India celebrated with joy its first day of freedom. The 
sacrifices of generations of patriots and the blood of countries martyrs had 
borne fruit [...] But the sense of joy [...] was mixed with pain and sadness [...] 
[For] even at the very movement of freedom a communal orgy, accompanied 
by indescribable brutalities, was consuming thousands of lives in India and 
Pakistan (Chandra, 1971:305-6). 
The British ruled India for 200 years, and they pitched one community against 
the other in order to control and weaken the anti-colonial movement. They 
succeeded in creating a feeling of anxiety among the minority community, 
particularly Muslims, that with the Hindu majority their well-being would be 
unsafe, both socially and economically. As a result, some Muslim community 
leaders demanded a seat quota in the provincial legislature and a separate electorate 
and the British acceded to their demands by Act of 1909. Around that period, 
Hindu Mahasbha and its leader, V.D. Savarkar, argued for Hindutva.  
As Sushil Srivastava notes:  
It is quite evident that no temple-mosque controversy was known in Ayodhya 
till the nineteenth century. Local stories were put into circulation and claims 
were raised over the places of worship in Ayodhya. The British played a 
significant role in strengthening the claim by providing the local stories with 
a historical basis (Srivastava, 1991:48). 
Srivastava considers Mughal rule in India positively, especially their policies 
towards other religions. ‚Comparing Muslim rule with the preceding Hindu rule 
and the succeeding British rule […] Muslim rule alone preserved the social fabric 
in India‛ (Srivastava, 1991:50). Another prominent historian, Sarvepalli Gopal, 
emphasised that:  
There is again no conclusive proof that the mosque, built at the time of 
Babur, was on a temple site or that a temple had been destroyed to build it. It 
is true that the mosque incorporates pillars which have non-Islamic motifs; 
but the explanation for this may well lie in the employment of Hindu 
craftsmen in the building of mosques or incorporating of material from any 
derelict building in the vicinity which would have had a non-religious 
function or even being associated with non-Hindu sects (Gopal, 1991:11).  
It seems that British colonial rulers deliberately attempted to falsify Indian 
history, as they wanted to portray the entire Mughal period as being oppressive 
towards Hindus, making it seem that British rule was better for them. Weeks before 
leaving India, the British divided the country into ‘Hindu-majority’ India and 
‘Muslim-majority’ Pakistan. The partition resulted in the migration of nearly 15 
million people and millions were estimated to have been killed in the violent 
communal clashes, following Partition in 1947.   
The RSS aims to alter the teaching of Indian history and favour uncritical 
glorification of Hindu culture, overlooking caste oppression, subjugation and social 
inequality, while blaming everything wrong in India on Muslims and devaluing 
their contribution to the Indian nation. The RSS and the Hindutva forces have a 
single-issue agenda namely, to establish a Hindu Rashtra (Hindu nation). 
Consequently, no matter what the RSS or the BJP says, their basic agenda for 
education is to prepare the intellectual foundations of this Hindu Rashtra and they 
are making the changes in education policy as a preparation for that. For example, 
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in history, the RSS suggests that the Aryans were in fact indigenous to India and 
that they went to other places from India, reflecting a sense of superiority of Indian 
culture over other cultures. Then this Aryan culture is being equated with the Vedic 
culture and is propagated as evidence of the superiority of the Hindu religion. They 
present an outlook which ignores that human civilization is based on give and take 
between different peoples and cultures. Their explanation ignores the evidence 
because assertions about the superiority of any particular culture have absolutely 
no empirical evidence. In the process they are also overlooking the multiple roots 
of Indian culture and in effect apotheosizing the Hindu religion. 
Hindutva organisations believe that Hindus may have different cultures and 
languages, but they must be united. They consider Hindus to be members of a 
homogeneous community, who acknowledge a common religion, history, civil 
identity and law. The RSS blame Muslims for the partition of India. While two or 
three decades ago the Hindutva organisations represented a small section of Indian 
society, more recently they have become very importantallowing the BJP to form a 
government at the centre and in many states in North, Central and West India. 
Indeed Hindutva views have been projected as the national culture and it appears 
that ‚unity in diversity‛ is no longer the rallying cry of Indian nationalism. 
In pre-colonial India, the social forms of religious organisations and their 
articulations were historically different to those in Europe. For example, 
throughout the Middle Ages and up to the mid-17th century, Europe witnessed a 
major conflict between the Roman Catholic Church and nation states for 
supremacy. The struggle between these two powerful major institutions to obtain 
supremacy is known as the state vs. church controversy. In fact, with the rise of 
Protestantism in Europe, in the mid-16th century, a bitter debate started between 
Roman Catholics and Protestants, which at the beginning of the 17th century war 
became a major war between these two sects that continued for three decades and 
affected the whole of Europe. Peace between the two powerful groups was finally 
restored with the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia. 
British colonial rule in India in the 19th century brought about some important 
changes in Indian society and economy. It led to the introduction of bourgeois 
property rights, extensive trade, expansion of seaports, railways, telegraphs, and 
modern education. However, at the same time, local handicraft industries were 
ruined, causing de-industrialisation. Colonial modernisation was deeply 
exploitative, creating uneven development amongst different regions and sectors. 
In agriculture, it promoted monoculture and cash crop production, which 
undermined the local ecology and environment. Despite caste divisions, pre-
colonial society lived side-by-side without competition, keeping local autonomy 
intact in the villages. After British rule, they began to lose this local autonomy, and 
at the same time new classes, such as industrialists and factory workers, emerged 
(Siddiqui, 2014a). 
However, seventy years on since independence a different wind seems to be 
blowing, a wind hostile to everything that went into the construction of India as a 
secular state, where irrespective of religious beliefs, people are treated equally 
before the law of the land. It is the responsibility of Indian academics, and all 
secular and progressive people not to allow a biased and incorrect representation of 
India’s image that may well destroy the essence of what we have inherited and the 
humanistic values we wish to add to that inheritance. 
The Hindutva forces are now more visible than before and opportunistically 
using their ideologies for the purposes of political mobilisation, mixing Indian 
identity with a narrow sectarian religious identity. The RSS and other Hindutva 
organisations have accepted the British colonial interpretation of India’s past, in 
particular their emphasis on religious antagonism that encourages communalisation 
and a divided society. This interpretation of history was promoted by the colonial 
administration to ‘divide and rule’ communities encouraging communal division of 
society (Thapar, 2013). The colonial interpretation of history was to exaggerate 
religious differences and antagonism encouraging communal division of society, 
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without any evidence from the past. History was narrated and falsified to fit the 
interests of the colonial rulers, not to create harmony among the people.  
V. D. Savarkar, who was not a religious person, but represented the religion-
based, two-nation theory in pre-independence India. His major argument was that 
Hindus and Muslims constituted two different nations that were unable to coexist 
and were historically irreconcilable with each other. Having won independence, 
Indians heaved a sigh of relief that, despite Partition and the horrendous genocidal 
violence that accompanied it, the newly born Indian nation had decided to follow a 
course fundamentally at odds with the anti-national forces on both the Muslim and 
Hindu right.  
Nationalism should be identified with a society and country, and it also needs to 
be a progressive nationalism of the 21st century, not one based on religion alone 
whether Hindu, Muslim or Sikh. On the issue of Hindutva’s ‘cultural nationalism’ 
Romila Thapar said:  
Nationalism is one basic concept that has to do with giving citizenship to all 
people living in a country and who are its nationals. It brings everyone 
together to build a society committed to human rights. […] and abide by the 
same obligations to the state […] Cultural nationalism does not mean 
differentiating between citizens on the basis of culture [religion] (Thapar 
cited in Salam, 2016). 
It was the mass mobilization which really gave the freedom struggle a very 
different character. That mass mobilization was predicated on an agenda that went 
beyond simply getting rid of the British and included social emancipation, 
economic development, universal franchise, the abolition of caste inequalities, 
political democracy and all that the like of which the country had never seen. 
Nationalism cannot be built on a religious identity alone, as mistakenly claimed 
by the RSS and other Hindutva organisations. Just like the British colonizers did 
when they established their rule in India, these organisations interpret Indian 
history on the basis of religious identity alone, using this as a means to ‘divide and 
rule’ the people of India. As Panikkar (2004) argues:  
[Hindutva] takes a static view of cultural tradition, ignoring its inherent 
dynamism. One of the consequences of this attitude is the intolerance of 
different interpretations and conflicting representations for which the Indian 
cultural tradition is justly famous […]. A marginal force until about 10 years 
ago, it [Hindutva] is now in a position to dictate the political and cultural 
agenda of the nation […]. The decline of the Congress and the inability of the 
Left to emerge as an alternative provided the space for Hindutva to imbue 
such interventions with a political content. [...] Hindutva thus succeeded in 
integrating politics with culture. Hence cultural nationalism is the real 
shining motif of Hindutva. Given its exclusivist character, however, cultural 
nationalism is anti-democratic and anti-national. The existence of India as a 
nation is possible only with the rejection of cultural nationalism (Panikkar, 
2004). 
After independence, the weaknesses in the implementation of the land reforms 
and also failures to curtail the socio-economic powers of the landlords and money 
lenders gave further opportunities to obstructionist forces. Moreover, the reliance 
on traders and big land owners for political support compelled the government to 
compromise with the divisive communalist forces (Siddiqui, 1997). The deepening 
of economic crisis in the post-independent period created conditions in which 
community, caste and class rivalry and competition were aggravated. As Hasan 
(1982) notes:  
Economic development in the post-independent period was retarded and 
slow; consequently, politics and mobilisation took place around individuals, 
factions, and communities rather than on issues of development and reforms. 
Hindus and Muslims have been interlocked in a competition for survival and 
advancement magnified against the backdrop of underdevelopment (Hasan, 
1982:30). 
During elections the Congress Party extended patronage to powerful 
individuals. This was seen as being convenient because Muslim electoral support 
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has depended on addressing their grievances and all efforts were sought to gain 
support of conservative elements such as the Imams for delivering votes. 
Unfortunately more than six decades of democratic process have not only failed to 
undermine religious and caste solidarity, but in fact in recent years such tendencies 
have strengthened. 
In fact, in India where there is a mass poverty, violence has been the 
predominant route to power, and democracy has tended to increase political 
violence. The elites who wanted to remain in power found that scapegoating a 
minority a strategy that worked. It was not institutional weakness that explained the 
variations in state response to riots in India, but instructions given by politicians 
concerning whether or not to protect minorities.  
 
7. The Rise of the BJP 
Prior to the 1980s, the predecessor of the BJP, Jana Sangh, had very little 
popular support. In fact, the Hindu Mahasbha gave birth to the Jana Sangh, which 
is today called BJP. The BJP party had initially drawn its support mainly from 
upper-caste Hindus. V.D. Savarkar’s and Golwalkar’s elaboration of Hindutva 
provided the foundation for the RSS, which was later on transformed into the 
political party, which is now known as BJP (Corbridge & Harris, 2000; Graham, 
1990). 
The BJP rose to power at a remarkable pace; the two seats it had in 1989 had 
risen to 119 by 1996. It was then still a minority party in the lower house of the 
Indian parliament which has 543 members in total (Vanaik, 2001). The BJP 
benefitted from a political and ideological vacuum, situating itself as an alternative 
to the Congress Party, at a time when people were disillusioned with the Congress 
party as the government was consistently facing accusations of corruption. At a 
time of economic crisis and uncertainty, the concept of Hindu unity functioned as a 
means of social stabilisation. The BJP put itself forward as the defender of ‚Hindu 
society‛ and continued with its use of offensive propaganda against the Muslim 
community. A central element in this re-orientation was the Shah Bano case and 
the Ayodhya campaign. As Ahmed has observed regarding communalism, ‚as an 
aggressive kind of rightist nationalism [...] it takes advantage of the misery of the 
masses‛ (Ahmed: 2004:23). 
The Supreme Court of India took a decision on the Shah Bano case which 
concerned maintenance for a divorced Muslim wife in her favour. This was seen by 
Muslim organisations as interference in Shariah Law, which being a divine, they 
believe is ordained by God and not to be changed. Without realising long term 
consequences, Muslim organisations organised protests and Rajiv Gandhi’s 
government amended the law in their favour (Engineer, 1995) On February 25 
1986, the Muslim Women’s Bill was moved in Parliament to override the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in the Shah Bano case. This provided new ammunition for right-
wing Hindu organisations, who referred to this as ‘appeasement’ of Muslims and 
they mobilised Hindus against it. Under pressure to tackle Hindu grievances, Rajiv 
Gandhi’s government opened the doors of Babri mosque at Ayodhya for Hindus to 
worship there (Girdner & Siddiqui, 1990). 
Right-wing Hindu organisations appealed to those who had enough of the 
Congress Party’s corruption, nepotism and inefficiency and were looking for an 
alternative. These organisations carefully projected themselves as the alternative to 
Congress misrule presenting and themselves as being principled, honest and 
disciplined. They even denied their communalist and fascist character, but not for 
long. In the late 1990s they projected Vajpayee as a ‘moderate’ and liberal leader. 
But he later admitted that this liberal stance had been dictated by political 
expediency. 
In August 1990, the then Prime Minister V.P. Singh announced his 
government’s decision to implement the Mandal Commission Report which 
recommended that 27% of government jobs to should be reserved for other 
‘backward castes’. The fear of losing the support of upper-caste Hindus, due to the 
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Mandal Commission proposals These two above reasons seemed to be important 
reasons for the BJP’s decision to mobilise Hindus and campaign to build Ram 
temple at Ayodhya. The BJP’s political force remained confined to the north and 
western Indian states until the mid-1990s. As Jaffrelot (1996) observes: 
Largely due to the stress it put on a Sanskritised culture, an upper caste 
(largely Brahminical) ethos which was more prevalent in North India and an 
anti-Muslim attitude to which South India was less receptive given the 
greater integration of Islam in this region… Up to the 1980s, in effect Hindu 
nationalism recruited most of its supporters among the urban upper caste, 
middle caste and the landed elite of North India (Jaffrelot, 1996:7). 
Moreover, state-owned television aired weekly instalments of a serialisation of 
the Ramayana which glorified the past. This strengthened Hindus’ religious 
sentiments and beliefs (Corbridge & Harris, 2000). People’s frustration and 
grievances were fully exploited by the right-wing Hindu organisations and they 
were successful in exploiting the disillusionment of the people. 
If anything can be learnt from the past experiences and policies then, it seems 
that Congress Party had been peddling soft Hindutva whilst the BJP peddled a 
hard-core version. The Congress Party felt if it antagonised both Muslims and 
Hindu right-wing extremists then it would not be able to win elections. The 
Congress Party did not have the will and determination to take on Hindu extremists 
and punish them for the crimes against minorities. Therefore, it appears to have put 
winning elections before its principles. 
V.P. Singh’s National Front coalition government came to power in 1989 and 
adopted an ambivalent policy towards Babri mosque. In order to consolidate his 
power and its electoral victory he showed his intention to implement the Mandel 
Commission’s recommendations, which was supposed to increase the 
representation of lower castes in government jobs, traditionally the domain of the 
Hindu upper castes. As a reaction to this in August 1990 L.K. Advani launched his 
rath yatra (literally, chariot procession) through the northern Indian states, starting 
from Somnath temple in Gujarat and to end ending at the Babri mosque in 
Ayodhya. In each town that his procession passed through, communal riots and 
violence against Muslims flared up and community relations worsened, 
culminating in the demolition of the Babri mosque in 1992 (Vanaik, 2001; Graham, 
1990), an act of destruction for which no one was prosecuted. As Bhatt (2001) 
observes:  
The emergence in 1984 of an organised mass campaign by VHP for the 
building of a Ram temple on the site of the medieval Babri mosque in 
Ayodhya, Uttar Pradesh; secular protest against a Hindu nationalist defence 
of the self-immolation of the widow RoopKanwar in Rajasthan in 1987, […] 
‘Communal violence’, directed against Muslim and Sikh communities, 
increased dramatically in India during the 1980s (Bhatt, 2001:170). 
The parliamentary election of 1996 was one of the most dramatic in the political 
history of India, when Hindu communalist organisations led by BJP and Shiv Sena 
emerged as the largest single bloc in the Indian parliament. With this campaign the 
party mobilised all corners of India with the aim of uniting Hindus, although it 
inflamed violence and undermined the harmony among the different communities 
(Siddiqui, 2009a). However, the BJP gained politically and won 161 seats in 1996 
and then 182 seats in 1999. The RSS is the organisational strength of the BJP. The 
BJP senior leaders pledged their allegiance to the RSS. The relationship between 
BJP and the RSS was very close and as stated by former BJP leader Mr. A.B 
Vajpayee in 1997: ‚The post [of Prime Minister] may go tomorrow, but I will 
always remain a humble swayamasevak [RSS volunteer/activist]‛ (Noorani, 
2000:4). 
 
8. Communalist Attacks against Minorities 
The socio-economic crisis worsened in India in the 1960s with the Sino-India 
war in 1962 and the India-Pakistan war in 1965. As a result, there was further 
slowing down of growth rates and food shortages, and the tensions between Hindus 
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and Muslims re-emerged in the late 1960s. It is well known that in India 
communalist violence did not occur spontaneously and was rarely caused by 
religious animosity. Cultural and religious differences rarely led to the kind of 
organised attacks and large scale violence seen in recent years. Such differences 
may be exploited and heightened at the behest of political groups. In large urban 
areas the Muslim presence is resented not for religious reasons but becomes a 
source of tension due to competition in the job market. The limited opportunities 
caused by slow growth in the economy and higher levels of competition among 
communities can lead to increased frustration.  
Right-wing Hindu organisations take advantage of this situation to create an 
environment of fear and jealousy among social groups. As Hasan (1982:33) 
observes: ‚The relative success and prosperity of Muslim businessmen in recent 
years was the cause of much antagonism in Moradabad. In the brassware trade, in 
particular, Muslims received extensive orders from West Asia which were 
perceived as an impetus to their trade and industry […] now had sufficient capital 
to purchase sophisticated tools, to own property, to spend on education, and to 
initiate new ventures. All this generated hostility among Hindu traders‛.  
In 1962 during the Jabalpur riot, Congress Party local leaders were directly 
involved in the attack against Muslims but no action was taken against them. The 
1969 violence between Hindus and Muslims also took place in Gujarat. A year 
later in Bhivandi riots some 300 Muslims were killed. The Justice Madan 
Commission Report clearly implicated Shiv Sena in taking part in attacking 
Muslims and burning their property while police quietly looked on or encouraged 
the attackers but no action was taken on the basis of the judicial report. The 
Ahmedabad Commission of Inquiry into the 1969 communalist violence led by 
Justice P. Jagmohan Reddy from the Supreme Court, notes: ‚The agitation has 
received the blessing of the local Jana Sangh workers […] calling to sever all 
economic and social relations with the community that has attacked their religion 
viz. the Muslims‛. The report by the Justice Vithayathil Commission of Inquiry on 
the Tellicherry disturbances in 1971 concluded: ‚I have no doubt that the RSS had 
taken an active part in rousing up anti-Muslim feeling among the Hindus of 
Tellicherry and in preparing the background for the disturbances‛. Justice D.P. 
Madan, who led the Commission of Inquiry into the violent disturbances in 
Bhiwandi concluded: ‚the guiding spirit was Dr. Vyas [local Jana Sangh leader]‛. 
(cited in Noorani, 2000:38). Justice P. Venugopal who led the Commission of 
inquiry into the communalist violence in Kanyakumari in 1982, wrote: ‚The RSS 
adopts a militant and aggressive attitude and sets itself up as the champion of what 
it considers to be the rights of Hindus against minorities‛ (Cited in Engineer, 
1995). 
Since the mid-1980s, there has been a qualitative change in the nature of 
communalist threats and violence. There is a large body of evidence pointing to the 
fact that the RSS and its affiliated organisations have consistently played a leading 
role in organising and inciting communalist hatred and violence. Various Judicial 
Commissions of inquiry on communalist violence have pointed towards the RRS. 
For instance, the Judicial Commissions on violence in Tellicherry (1971), Aligarh 
(1978), Moradabad (1980), Sambhal (1980) blames the RSS for inciting violence 
towards Muslims. These towns have witnessed some improvements in conditions; 
the Hindu traders resented any small improvements in the living conditions of the 
local Muslims and RSS involvement worsened the situation among the 
communities. Moreover, in many instances, community bias among the district 
administration and police seems to be evident from most accounts which highlight 
that they not only aided and abetted the rumours against Muslims but also 
perpetuated atrocities against them. The bias could be seen in refusing the stop the 
mobs from looting and killing. There seem to be lack of will to uphold the law as 
the state government has often failed to pursue matters and take any action against 
those involved.  
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In Ferozabad, the bangle industries were owned by Hindus, while Muslims 
worked largely as craftsmen. However, a small minority among the Muslims began 
setting up as independent producers, and became seen as business competitors and 
a threat by the Hindu traders; in 1972 riots took place which led to the burning of 
businesses owned by the Muslim community. Here it seems that class conflicts 
were concealed as Hindu-Muslim religious conflict. 
After the demolition of the Babri mosque, a number of incidents of 
communalist violence took place between Hindus and Muslims in most parts of 
India. In cities such as Bombay, the police supported by BJP and Shiv Sena 
actively took part in attacking Muslims (Srikrishna Commission, 1998). The RSS 
and BJP succeeded in stirring up hatred amongst the people of Gujarat. The tribals, 
Dalits and low caste Hindus traditionally supported the Congress Party, but the BJP 
worked among these groups in introducing a number of welfare programmes to 
gain their trust and support. The BJP was able to successfully construct a unified 
Hindu identity and make them feel proud of being a Hindu. 
The violence unleashed in the post-Godhra riots on 28th February 2002, after 
the burning alive of 58 innocent people on a train coach made common knowledge 
the complicity of state administration and police involvement in the attacks against 
the Muslim community. The violence continued for more than two months, with 
more than 2,000 Muslims losing their lives (Engineer, 2002). The worst attack 
against the Muslim community took place in 2002 in Gujarat in Naroda-Patia, 
which was a slum most of whose inhabitants were Muslims. In a mob attack by 
Hindus more than 100 Muslims were burnt alive in full view of the state police 
force. Women were raped before being burnt alive. Even pregnant women were not 
spared. In one particularly gruesome case a pregnant Muslim woman had her 
womb opened and the foetus was extracted and then burnt before she herself was 
burnt (Engineer, 2002). Narendra Modi was then Gujarat’s chief minister was a by-
stander while his close party associates took an active part in planning and carrying 
out the attacks on Muslims.  
The recent book Splintered Justice by WarishaFarasat and PritaJha on riots in 
India presents a tiny fraction of the number of violent attacks that have occurred as 
part of communal disturbances (i.e. religious tensions) against Muslims there. The 
book provides detailed information about how such violence is handled by the 
police and local administration and is a devastating indictment of India’s system of 
justice. The book also allows us to understand why rioters continue to behave as if 
there are no major consequences for engaging in such violence, highlighting the 
culture of impunity that shields many of the perpetrators, and sends a chilling 
message to society. Farasat & Jha (2016) examine two episodes of communal 
massacre, namely, Bhagalpur in Bihar state in 1989 and Gujarat in 2002. The 
authors conclude that the underlying cynical use of polarisation as a political tool 
played a significant role in both incidences in which local Muslim inhabitants were 
targeted. The riots continued for weeks and resulted in large numbers of adults and 
children being killed and in other atrocities, such as rape and maiming of victims, 
largely from the minority community. The length of time for which the riots lasted 
suggested at best inadequate efforts at control by the local government a significant 
degree of complicity by state officials (Farasat & Jha, 2016). 
In the case of the Gujarat riots, the complicity of the BJP government, led by 
Narendra Modi, is well known. But at the time of the Bhagalpur riots was ruled by 
a Congress government. In both cases, the partisan role of the police was clearly 
noted. There is evidence of their indifference to desperate pleas for help from 
victims as the riots initially flared and then spread together with delays in filing 
First Information Reports (FIRs). Their inaccurate FIRs failed to implicate the 
perpetrators or underplayed the effects of the violence, which subsequently made 
the legal process for survivors difficult, if not impossible. Careless investigations 
by the police further weakened the legal case against perpetrators (Farasat & Jha, 
2016). 
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During his state election campaign in 2002, Modi was seen as a hero and with 
him the RSS/BJP found the "strong" leader they sought. The charismatic 
demagoguery of Modi was on full display in that campaign. Modi was 
ideologically groomed by the RSS before becoming leader of the BJP. He played 
with the emotions of the crowd skilfully, and stoked their prejudices with bone-
chilling messages about "enemies of the state". His campaign was unabashedly 
against the minorities. He campaigned as though he was running against Mian 
Musharraf, the military ruler of neighbouring Pakistan, ignoring the Congress 
candidate who was actually his opponent. The manoeuvre blended aggressive 
Hindu nationalism with jingoistic patriotism for a potent, toxic mix. Given his 
campaigning skills, it was astonishing that the BJP had not fielded him in elections 
before. If such a politician had chosen to work for all citizens, he could have done 
much good, and Muslims would have voted for him too. But in 2002, Modi 
focused on winning the election. To ensure sufficient consolidation of the Hindu 
vote, he seemed prepared to write-off the Muslim minority altogether. He did not 
need, or want, their votes. 
In his recent book Hashimpura Retold (2016), V.N. Rai presents harrowing 
first-person evidence of police brutality against Muslims in Meerut in Uttar 
Pradesh state. He narrates the events of May 22, 1987, when the Provincial Armed 
Constabulary (PAC) carried out a massacre that so badly tarnished their reputation 
that remains to this day. Zulfiqar, Babudin and Kamruddin were witnesses to the 
gory killings of innocent young men who had been rounded up from their village 
by the PAC. The oldest men and boys were segregated from the young men and 
were eventually released after a warning and a volley of expletives; the younger 
men were not so lucky. They were hauled inside a truck, asked to sit on its floor, 
surrounded by PAC men and driven to the Upper Ganga Canal, a 90-minute drive 
from their village. Once the vehicle reached its destination, the men were pushed 
out one by one, shot and thrown into the canal, which was then in full flood. Most 
died on the spot, Rai narrates the story of those who survived, quietly exposing the 
prejudiced mindset of the PAC men who rounded up and shot them in cold blood. 
Rai presents their stories in their own words and shows glimpses of the mind set of 
common people keen to help the victims but worried for their own safety (Rai, 
2016). 
According to Zulfiqar:  
‚It was around 6:00 in the evening on May 22, 1987, when I went to the 
terrace of our house to offer namaz, [prayer] when some policemen came in. 
They brought me, my father and my two uncles outside our lane on the road 
where some 400 to 500 people were squatting. We were made to sit with 
them [...]. The PAC men divided the people into two groups. On the one hand 
were youngsters and on the other were old men and children. They left out 
the old people and kids, and whisked away many others, including my father 
and two uncles, in PAC trucks. The remaining forty-five physically strong 
people, including me, were ordered to board the last waiting truck [...]. The 
PAC men surrounded us in the truck in such a way that our view of the 
outside was blocked. After about an hour and a half, the truck turned towards 
a road running parallel to Ganga Canal in Muradnagar and came to a halt 
after about one and a half kilometres.‛ (Cited by Salam, 2016b)  
In another study by Rana Ayyub (2016) interviewed political leaders and 
administrative and police officials who were working in the local administration 
during the riots and analysed the reasons why such extreme violent and 
discriminatory acts occurred during the 2002 riots. G.L. Singhal, who was head of 
the Gujarat’s Anti-Terrorism Squad, admitted his role in fake encounters and the 
extrajudicial murder (i.e. unlawful killing) of individuals from the Muslim 
community, commenting ‚Once you compromise, then you have to compromise 
with everything, yourself, your thoughts, conscience‛. (Ayyub, 2016:43) Ashok 
Narayan, Home Secretary for Gujarat observed,  
I always felt bad so many people [Muslims] were killed in the riots […] the 
Hindu community, their behaviour really shocked me […] looting houses 
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shamefully, they used to come in cars and loot […] [H]umans at their worst […] 
Several times, ministers were on the roads inciting crowds. (Ayyub, 2016:97-98) 
It is also relevant to cite Heredia’s comparison of the treatment by the Gujarat 
government of the victims of the Kutch earthquake which took place in January 
2001, and the ‚pogrom‛ in 2002:  
The differential response […] must be seen in the context of the different 
communities most affected by the two disasters. The earthquake victims of Kutch 
were largely the majority community [Hindus] and were far better treated than the 
refugees of the post-Godhra riots [Muslims] a year later, in the same state by the 
same government, where the minority community by far suffered the most. 
(Heredia, 2016:27) 
In analysing the events in 2002, AshutoshVarshney (2017) supports the use of 
the term ‚pogrom‛:  
A pogrom is defined as a mob attack, either approved or condoned by 
authorities, against the persons and property of a religious, racial, or national 
minority. Gujarat 2002 fits this definition well. Dozens of eye-witness stories can 
be cited. The non-state organisations, most closely allied with the BJP 
Government, approved of violence. The VHP called it ‚the first positive response 
of the Hindus to Muslim fundamentalism in 1000 years‛. The RSS said: ‚Let the 
minorities understand their real safety lies in the goodwill of the majority,‛ not in 
laws. […] In short, it was not a case of the government trying to prevent massacres, 
but one in which the government looked the other way, and considerable abetting 
also took place. It was a pogrom (Varshney, 2017). 
In 2002, the BJP also ruled the Central government with Vajpayee as Prime 
Minister, and rather than taking action, he blamed the victims for this heinous 
crimes, despite his image as the soft face of Hindutva as required in such a diverse 
country as India. In fact, he never got rid of his RSS roots, as Vajpayee has said at 
a VHP meeting in Straten Island in New York: ‚RSS is my soul‛ (Engineer, 2002). 
Soon after the Gujarat pogrom that began on February 28, 2002, then Prime 
Minister Vajpayee spoke at the BJP’s national executive meeting in Goa on April 
12 and said publicly against the Muslim minority in such a communal partisanship, 
which is unthinkable in a democracy. He defended Narendra Modi, the man 
responsible for the ‘Gujarat genocide’ against the Muslim minority. Mr. Vajpayee 
said: ‚What happened after the Godhra incident is reprehensible, but the issue is, 
who started it?‛ Not the identified individuals of Godhra but the entire Muslim 
community ‚started it‛. He went to blame the community globally, ‚Wherever 
there are Muslims, they do not want to live with others. Instead of living 
peacefully, they want to preach and propagate their religion by creating fear and 
terror in the minds of others‛ (Noorani, 2016b). 
The Gujarat pogrom in 2002 represented a new departure from previous attacks 
on Muslims in the state because of the extensive evidence of a large-scale pre-
planned attack by the Hindu Right and of close collaboration amongst right-wing 
Hindu organisations, politicians and the police. This extensive planning and 
execution indicate that this was an attempt to annihilate Muslim businesses from 
the state. As Oza (2007:164-65) observes: ‚This extreme planning could only have 
been happened were this information collected and made available to Sangh [...] In 
the days after the most intensive violence was over, cities and towns emerged with 
completely destroyed homes, shops, and restaurants that often stood adjacent to 
places left untouched‛. In Gujarat state, the Muslim minority were overwhelmingly 
the victims of pillage, murder and terror, resulting in the deaths of more than 2,000 
men, women and children. Women, in particular, were subjected to brutal acts of 
violence and were left largely unprotected by the security forces. 
The riots in Bhagalpur in 1989 and Gujarat in 2002 are two glaring episodes of 
government complicity in communal attacks against the Muslim minority. Very 
often in the literature of communal violence, the state’s role is seen in terms of its 
‚failure‛ to protect the minorities. Farasat & Jha (2016) show the limitations of this 
approach. ‚Failure‛ would imply that the state’s intentions to protect the minorities 
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were defeated, whether due to institutional or procedural weaknesses, or other 
reasons. The authors argue that the state was a collaborator in the violence in 
Bhagalpur and Gujarat revealing its complicity at local government levels. There is 
a deep state-society nexus that sustains violence against minorities. In 1989 in 
Bhagalpur, the then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, after reprimanding the Congress 
Chief Minister of Bihar, then caved in under communal pressure and revoked the 
transfer of the Bhagalpur police chief K.S. Dwivedi who had been charged with 
inaction during the riots. However, the denial of justice and reparations to victims 
is not simply a result of institutional failures; rather, the state sided with the rioters, 
indicating its complicity in the violence. This reflects the endemic institutional bias 
of the police and judiciary and suggests this was deliberate, systematic and 
planned. 
An earlier study by Gyanendra Pandey on Hindu-Muslim riots in Bhagalpur 
notes that: 
This round of violence began in the last week of October 1989; arson, 
looting, murder spread from the city to the surrounding countryside and 
dragged practically unchecked for several days [...] Given the scale of the 
‚riots‛, and the infamous role of the local administration in encouraging the 
attacks and suppressing the evidence, it is impossible to establish the ‚facts‛ 
of this occurrence [...] Possibly as many as a thousand people were killed in 
the course of violence, most of them Muslims, but estimates of the causalities 
still vary enormously. During the first days of the ‚riots‛, trains were stopped 
repeatedly at different places in Bhagalpur and its neighbouring districts; 
from several of these, Muslims travellers were dragged out and lynched 
(Pandey, 1992:33-34). 
During the 2002 riots in Gujarat, the conduct of Chief Minister Modi was very 
much like a partisan and a pracharak (activist) of the RSS. He even justified the 
genocide of Muslims in Gujarat by saying, ‚Every action has an equal and opposite 
reaction‛. Under the BJP, state police had been politicised. As Chief Minister of 
Gujarat in 2002 Modi failed to protect the Muslim minority, his prime focus being 
to inflame anti-Muslim prejudices by manipulating the Godhra incident and its 
violent aftermath to consolidate the Hindu vote. The recently published data from 
the 2011 Census shows that Muslims represent the largest minority in India 
constituting 14.2% of its total population of 1.21 billion. But they are to be found at 
the bottom of most socio-economic indices facing a high level of destitution and 
disparity. 
However, soon after the BJP victory in the Parliamentary elections in 2014, 
Ashok Singhal, the leader of the VHP, a sister organisation of the BJP stated, 
‚Muslims […] must learn to respect Hindu sentiments. If they keep opposing 
Hindus, how long they can survive?‛ (Quoted in Jha, 2014). 
The last two decades have seen the systematic capture of socio-political and 
cultural space by communal and religious right-wing forces, represented this time 
by Hindutva. They have not only managed to win a popular mandate to rule India 
with the help of opportunistic alliances with ‚secular‛ parties, but have also 
unleashed a scathing attack on India’s religious and ethnic diversity in addition, 
extreme right-wing organisations like Hindutva are using a number of offensive 
and manipulative strategies to bring the lumpen proletariat and unemployed 
elements to isolate and attack minorities, particularly Muslims. In fact, since the 
late 1980s, the Hindutva forces consistently campaigned for the building of Ram 
Mandir, which finally led to the demolition of the Babri Masjid (mosque) in 1992, 
and also planned and executed the genocidal pogrom against Muslims in Gujarat in 
2002 in the presence of both the police and the media. 
The Gujarat riot confirms that bringing into focus the twin elements of mass 
participation and state complicity in communal carnage, leaving the victims with 
no recourse either to the collective wisdom of civil society or to the rule of law. 
The fact that social groups previously considered to be opposed to the Hindu Right, 
such as Dalits and Adivasis, played an active role in the 2002 riots, added to the 
complexity of the situation. The demolition of the Babri mosque took place when 
Journal of Economic and Social Thought 
JEST, 4(2), K. Siddiqui, p.142-186. 
178 
the BJP was in power in UP state. The ominous truth is that India is becoming a 
fascist state where violence is encouraged by the main political forces in both local 
and central government with the active collusion of officials. 
Another study by Paul Brass (2003) focuses on the riot-prone north Indian city 
of Aligarh in UP state where he has studied communal violence for nearly three 
decades. He found cynical manipulation of religious passions by some business 
owners, criminals and ill-intentioned politicians who focused on short-term 
electoral gains. According to him, these groups are complicit in the spread of 
misinformation and hate and that perpetuates riots. Brass analysed the occurrence 
of riots in Aligarh and tested his thesis that Hindu-Muslim economic competition 
acted as a source of conflict and riots. His research convincingly demonstrates that 
for several decades, violence has repeatedly occurred in five specific localities in 
Aligarh. In these localities, there is a visible presence of cultural/religious 
organisations, politicians and businesses that are willing to spread hate and 
mobilise people for violent attacks on their non-Hindu neighbours. Brass 
challenges the earliertheory that riots are spontaneous occurrences of mob anger, 
arguing that this communal violence in Aligarh is planned, orchestrated and 
institutionalized and that this explains its persistence (Brass, 2003). 
Dalit and Muslim traders are attacked by so-called guaraskshaks (cow 
vigilantes). In 2016 BJP members publically flogged four Dalits in Una, a town in 
Gujara, for allegedly killing a cow and uploaded a video of this beating and 
humiliation of Dalits on social media. In fact, these Dalits were skinning a dead 
cow for leather as their ancestors have done for centuries to earn a small amount of 
money to eke out a living as they are not rich enough to own dairy farms and breed 
milch cows. The attackers claimed that they were carrying out their religious duty 
to protect cows and that their action was justified even if it meant taking the law 
into their hands. They were also apparently confident that both the local and central 
government would justify their actions. If such fascist volunteers of cow vigilantes 
(private army) are not restrained, they would undoubtedly be willing to hurt large 
numbers of Dalits all over India both physically and economically. In fact, the 
protection of cow is just recruited as another highly emotive symbol to control and 
subjugate the country’s Muslim and Christian minorities and Dalits into submission 
and fear. 
 
9. Institutional Bias 
The Congress government failed to act decisively against communalists and 
despite regular occurrences of riots and attacks against minorities, especially 
Muslims over the course of nearly seven decades, no action has ever been taken 
against the perpetrators. The Government did set up Judicial Commissions 
whenever major violence riots took place to determine the causes and initiators of 
the riots. However, the government completely failed to implement the findings of 
these Commissions. Neither the Congress nor any other government has ever 
punished those who were guilty for these communal riots, despite them having 
been identified by the Judicial Commissions. There seems to be lack of will on the 
government side to protect minorities and side with the victims. This was also the 
case during the anti-Sikh riots which took place in November 1984 after the 
assassination of Indira Gandhi when more than 4,000 Sikhs were massacred. These 
attacks on the Sikh community were led by Congress leaders in Delhi and other 
Indian cities (Singh, 2015). 
Regarding the issue of protection of religious minorities against discrimination 
and existing mechanism for accountability Singh (2015:51) has argued: ‚The 
National Commission for Minorities constituted as late as 1993 – more than 43 
years after the formation of the Indian Republic in 1950 – remains a mere paper 
tiger without the power and institutional infrastructure to track systematic inbuilt 
bias against religion minorities […] Hindu majoritarian bias, pervades the Indian 
constitution, bureaucracy, security forces, parliamentary institutions, judiciary, 
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prison, academic institutions, health services, media and cultural and art 
organisations‛. 
Further, on the question of institutional communalism Singh (2015:52) observes 
that: ‚Institutional communalism became evident in the Supreme Court decision to 
award the death sentence to Mohammed Afzal Guru, a Kashmiri militant who was 
secretly hanged on 9th February 2013. The bench deciding his case said that the 
death sentence was necessary in order to satisfy ‘the national conscience’, which is 
a surrender of legal reasoning to a structure of bias‛.  
Manisha Sethi (2013) also finds systematic bias in the workings of the 
intelligence agency and police in their dealings with members of the religious 
minority communities, particularly Muslims, who have found to be the victims of 
these government agencies during Hindu mob attacks: ‚In the case of terror attacks 
or communalist riots, if the police go after the perpetrators of violence, and they 
happen to be mostly Muslims, you cannot, in the name of secularism, expect the 
police to act in proportion of their population‛ (M.N. Singh, former Commissioner 
of Police, Mumbai, cited in Sethi, 2013). 
Vrinda Grover notes that evidence collected shows there was clear Hindu bias 
in the working of the police and judiciary during the anti-Sikhs riots in 1984 in 
Delhi. The Congress government had protected the perpetrators of the violence and 
mass murders. The investigating agencies such as police, prosecutors and judiciary 
all collaborated to undermine justice (Singh, 2015). Further example of such bias 
could be seen in statements made by members of the judiciary, namely justice 
Sodhi, former Chief Justice of Allahabad High Court, revealed in the public 
meeting in Chandigarh that ‚no Sikh judge was trusted to deal with the Sikh 
terrorist cases‛ (Tribune, 2008, cited in Singh, 2015:52). 
Police bias in Maharashtra state is not an isolated case. As Noorani (2014) 
notes: ‚A remarkable feature of the major riots which erupted in Uttar Pradesh 
state in 1972-73 was that they were not conflicts between the communities but 
cases of the PAC assaulting Muslims. Three of the riots – in Aligarh, Ferozabad 
and Varanasi during June 1972 – were due entirely to the Muslim protests on the 
AMU [Aligarh Muslim University] Amendment Act. Unchecked, the riots spread. 
In Nonari [a village in Azamgarh district] 72 Muslim homes were burnt down on 
November 15, 1972; in Sajni on December 12, about 100 Muslim homes were 
looted and 43 were burnt. Some of the worst riots in Uttar Pradesh took place in 
1972 when Prime Minister Indira Gandhi held the Home portfolio‛. 
Amnesty International drew attention to extra judicial killings carried out by the 
PAC in 1987: ‚On 22nd May several hundred men from the Hashimpura area of 
Meerut were seen being taken away in several trucks by PAC members. Witnesses 
said most were taken to local police stations but several dozen in the first two or 
three trucks were reportedly taken to the bank of the Upper Ganga canal near 
Muradnagar, shot and their bodies thrown in the water… eyewitnesses said the 
bodies had been thrown in the canal by armed men in uniform‛ (Cited in Noorani, 
2014). Furthermore, justice B.N. Srikrishna’s report on the Mumbai riots in 1992-
93 notes the role played by the police: ‚The bias of policemen was seen in the 
active connivance of police constables with the rioting Hindu mobs on occasions, 
with their adopting the role of passive onlookers on occasions… This general 
apathy appears to be the outcome of the built-in prejudice in the mind of an 
average policeman that every Muslim is prone to crime‛ (Srikrishna, cited in 
Noorani, 2014). 
A number of studies have been done on genocide in Gujarat (Ayyub, 2016; 
Lokhande, 2015) and have recounted how Muslims were subjected to bloodshed, 
arson, rape and destruction to of their property whilst the law enforcement 
agencies, headed by then Chief Minister Narendra Modi, not only allowed such 
atrocities to take place but, in fact, advised the police not to attempt to stop the 
Hindu mob attacking Muslims. The former Congress MP Ehsan Jafri and some 69 
Muslim women and children were attacked by a Hindu mob in the Gulberg Society 
massacre (Engineer, 2002; Siddiqui, 2009b). To subvert justice public prosecutors 
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were appointed to the investigation, who were known supporters of the RSS/BJP 
whilst judicial witnesses were pressurised not to give evidence. Fake encounter 
cases were also common in which Muslim youths were cold-bloodedly killed on 
fabricated charges. Under Mr Modi’s watch things have been worse. And there has 
been no rehabilitation of the riot victims worth the name (Lokhande, 2015). 
On recent judgement by the Gujarat High Court regarding Jafri murder case, 
Kuldip Nayar (2016) commented that: 
I beg to differ with its judgment that the firing by Ehsan Jafri provoked the 
mob to kill him. I knew him and he was a staunch Congressman. The 
Gulbarg Society massacre was the doing of local Gujarati leaders hoping to 
parochialise the people… When Jafri was surrounded by the Hindu mob, he 
rang me up, seeking my help to rescue him from the frenzied crowd he had 
around him… Therefore, the Court’s verdict that Jafri provoked the crowd is 
misplaced. It is a travesty of justice. But then the Bench is not to blame 
because it has to go by the evidence placed before it. The prejudiced police 
had neither done their job, nor homework thoroughly… The tragedy is that 
even the judges have now been taken in by the sordid job done by the police 
(Nayar, 2016). 
As Harsh Mander (2016) points out about the bias in the India’s legal system:  
We have studied the aftermath of many communal massacres since 
Independence, and what binds them all is the pattern that few, if any, are 
punished for these crimes. This is the outcome of the communal bias or 
apathy of all arms of the criminal justice system: The police, prosecution, and 
courts; and the political, social and economic powerlessness of the victims of 
communal crimes. Among the survivors of these crimes - many of whom 
fight epic and hopeless battles for justice like the widows of the 1984 Sikh 
massacre or the survivors of the 2002 Gujarat massacre… The selectivity of 
or popular outrage and the application of the majesty of the legal system 
reveals a very troubling underlying majoritarian bias in society and law. A 
majority of those charged with terror crimes are religious minorities. While a 
majority of those charged with communal crimes are from the majority 
Hindu community, its victims are mostly religious minorities. If law and 
social outrage apply so differently when the minority is charged with hate 
crimes from when they are the paramount victims of mass hate crimes, then 
the promises of a secular Constitution - of equal treatment of all before the 
law - stands exposed, in tatters (Mander, 2016). 
However, recently, on July 8, 2016 the Supreme Court of India has delivered a 
stinging rebuke to the government over the continuation of the Armed Forces 
Special Powers Act (AFSPA). The Supreme Court of India has said that the Armed 
Forces Special Powers Act of 1958, enforce in parts of the North-East and Jammu 
and Kashmir, cannot be an excuse for extrajudicial killing. It observed that if 
armed forces were permitted to kill citizens on mere allegation and suspicion that 
they are enemy of the state, not only the rule of law but democracy would also be 
in ‚grave danger‛. According to Supreme Court, whenever such allegations surface 
they have to be investigated regardless of whether the person is a dreaded criminal, 
terrorist or an insurgent. Extrajudicial killings have been going on for some time. 
The case in Manipur state in which the judgment of the Supreme Court has been 
delivered has a list of 1528 deaths in counter-insurgency operations from which the 
Court has seen details on 62 and these are suspected of extrajudicial killings by 
para-military forces. The Bill was passed in 1958 to deal with the Naga insurgency 
in Assam state, but later on was imposed in other parts of the Northeast, in Punjab 
and in Jammu and Kashmir. The law was based on the Armed Forces (Special 
Powers) Ordinance of 1942, issued during the Quit India movement. It also grants 
soldiers executive powers to enter premises, search and arrest without a warrant 
(Indian Express, 2016). Moreover, the Jammu and Kashmir’s state assembly 
adopted a resolution on June 26, 2000, endorsing the in favour of state autonomy, 
and the resolution was forwarded it to the central government in New Delhi. The 
resolution urged restoration of the position as in 1952, before Sheikh Abdullah’s 
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arrest on August 9, 1953. Expansion of the Centre’s powers followed thereafter. 
Vajpayee, Prime Minister in 2000, rejected it (Noorani, 2016b; Siddiqui, 1991). 
Since assuming power in May 2014, Narendra Modi’s government and his BJP 
politicians have created an atmosphere of intolerance and hatred in India that has 
surpassed the worst expectations of his many critics (Siddiqui, 2014c). There has 
been an escalation of violence against Muslims and Christians, including the brutal 
lynching of a Muslim man in Dadri on suspicion of consuming beef. These events 
represent a direct assault on constitutionally protected freedom of speech and 
expression, and freedom of religion and belief. Intellectuals such as M. Kalburgi, 
G. Pansare and N. Dabholkar have recently been murdered in India. As a result, 
more than 50 writers have returned literary awards protest against the growing 
‚intolerance‛ and to condemn the government’s silence in the face of such crisis 
(Guardian, 2015). On the current scenario and deepening communal division and 
polarisation in Uttar Pradesh state, Hasan (2016) notes, ‚Ever since the Bharatiya 
Janata Party (BJP) came to power at the Centre, polarisation on issues such as ‘love 
jihad’, ‘ghar wapsi’ and the beef ban have become a regular feature of political 
mobilisation in Uttar Pradesh and the country at large… Its impact can be seen 
from the fact that BJP leaders who were implicated in the violence were given 
tickets and they won their seats with large margins. For the first time, not a single 
Muslim candidate was elected to Parliament from the [UP] State even though 
Muslims constitute over 19 % of its population and over 30 % of the population in 
quite a few districts of Western Uttar Pradesh‛. Moreover, Amartya Sen 
emphasises, under Modi, government intervention in the nation’s institutions ‚is 
more extensive, politically organised and connected with Hindutva movement [...] 
Often enough, the person chosen for heading institutions of national importance 
has been exceptionally dedicated to promoting Hindutva priorities‛ (Sen, 2015, 
cited in Noorani, 2015). 
 
10. Conclusion 
The ideology of Hindutva has received widespread coverage in the press in 
recent years, but it is a crude attempt to camouflage upper-caste Hindu groups, who 
have used religion as a tool to maintain their hegemony over the vast majority of 
the Indian people. In terms of their everyday experience, there is virtually nothing 
which would be common to all Hindus and to talk about one single ‘Hindu 
community’ is misleading. Brahminical revivalism began in the 8th century to the 
establishment of the Sultanates by the 12th century, the hegemonic cultures in 
India were Maurya (Buddhist) (5th century BCE-8th century CE), the Sultanates 
(1206-1526), the Mughals (1526-1757) and the British (1757-1947). Most 
Buddhists were converted to Hinduism and yet we are told that Hinduism is very 
tolerant religion. During British rule, in the census the tribal peoples were put into 
a separate category as following an ‘animistic’ religion; however, after 
independence this category disappeared from government records by the time of 
the 1951 census, and tribal peoples who had not converted to Christianity were 
recorded by the government as Hindus (Singh, 2015). 
This study found that the ideology of the RSS is based on hatred of religious 
minorities, particularly Muslims using this ‘enemy’, as a means to unite Hindus. 
Since independence in 1947 whenever the massacre of Muslims has taken place, 
the name of the RSS has been mentioned either in creating tension and disharmony 
among Hindus and Muslims, and/or taking part in these attacks on Muslims. 
Economic indicators highlight the plight and deterioration of the socio-economic 
conditions of Muslims in India. However, the RSS and its affiliate continue to 
oppose any policy measures to address these issues and to move towards inclusive 
development.  
The Hindu Rashtra is being sought to be established by targeting Muslims, 
Dalits, Christians and other minorities and also by attacking the principle of one 
man, one vote, one value bestowed by the Constitution. The violent religious 
frenzy of the ‚gaurakshaks‛ (cow vigilantes) is a realisation of the RSS’s Hindu 
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Rashtra agenda. Hindu Rashtra is rooted in caste hegemony (Sen, 2017). As Dr. 
Ambedkar noted seven decades ago that, ‚If Hindu Raj does become a fact, it will, 
no doubt be the greatest calamity for this country. No matter what the Hindus say, 
Hinduism is a menace to liberty, equality and fraternity. On that account it is 
incompatible with democracy. Hindu raj must be prevented at any cost… they take 
every move to exclude the lower classes of Hindus from wealth, education and 
power… This attitude of keeping education, wealth and power as a close preserve 
for themselves and refusing to share it, which the high caste Hindus have 
developed in their relation with lower classes of Hindus, is sought to be extended 
by them to the Muslims. They want to exclude the Muslims from place and power, 
as they have done to the lower class Hindus‛ (Cited in Salam, 2016). 
It is important to quote Dr B.R. Ambedkar’s who once said that, ‚I do not want 
that our loyalty as Indians should be in the slightest way affected by any 
competitive loyalty, whether that loyalty arises out of our religion, out of our 
culture or out of our language. I want all people to be Indians first, Indians last and 
nothing else but Indians‛  (cited in Habib, 2017). Dr. B.R. Ambedkar had warned 
during the discussions on the adoption of the draft Constitution: ‚While everybody 
recognises the necessity of the diffusion of Constitutional morality for the peaceful 
working of a democratic Constitution, there are two things interconnected with it 
which are not, unfortunately, generally recognised. One is that the form of 
administration has a close connection with the form of the Constitution. The form 
of the administration must be appropriate to and in the same sense as the form of 
the Constitution. The other is that it is perfectly possible to pervert the constitution, 
without changing its form by merely changing the form of administration and to 
make it inconsistent and opposed to the spirit of the Constitution… Constitutional 
morality is not a neutral sentiment. It has to be cultivated.‛ (Constitutional 
Assembly Debates, vol.7:38, Part VII)  
Indian Muslims have not been involved in Jehadi movements, as London based 
Economist (2014) explains that ‚Indian Muslims have remained moderate in spite 
of reasons for some gloom: they endure lower levels of education, income, political 
representation or government jobs than the majority Hindus. It suggested that a 
shared history of over a 1,000 years, a tradition of Sufi Islam and a recourse to a 
democratic framework along with a watchful State have kept Muslims moderate.‛ 
India’s traditions are plural and flexible, and therefore we need to understand that 
the view that secularism is necessary and the views of religious unity put forward 
by the militant Hindu organisations led by RSS is profoundly mistaken. 
The study have found that this contemporary form of fascism can be seen as a 
way of imposing the dictatorship of international finance capital on India while 
providing it with some kind of a mass base. The BJP plays a central role in this. 
This political group took no part in India’s struggle for independence - none of its 
members went to jail or participated in any anti-colonial movement. This is not the 
case for the liberal bourgeois parties since due to their origins they have a very 
different mode of functioning that accommodates different kinds of voices. 
Therefore it is very difficult for them to work for the establishment of the rule of 
international finance capital, while the BJP can do this. At the same time, the BJP 
can provide a mass base for that kind of a regime by whipping up communal 
frenzy. The necessity of fascism in the contemporary juncture arises from the 
tension between the existences of a polity in which a mass base is necessary while 
at the same time we live in a globalised world where the rule of international 
finance capital dictates the terms. This tension produces fascistic tendencies in a 
developing country like India (Banaji, 2016). 
At present, India faces an immense threat from fascism in the guise of Hindu 
nationalism. The process of uneven development and deepening socio-economic 
crisis has created conditions of backwardness and poverty, which in turn had 
created an opportunity for right-wing Hindu organisations to organise people on 
the basis of religion. The study finds that with the adoption of neoliberal economic 
policy, India is surrendering its sovereignty to global finance capital. 
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The counterpart of that domination is the communalisation of education. It is 
not possible to claim that everybody is equal while maintaining domination by the 
elite without justifying this in terms which are necessarily anti-democratic. India 
cannot have a secular democratic education while continuing to sustain this as an 
exclusive privilege for the upper caste and class. As a result, Hindutva forces invest 
money in education and introduce indoctrination at school level. So, the more the 
state retreats from social welfare responsibility, the more it becomes possible for 
these communal forces to move in and propagate their belief in as truth, which is 
very narrow, sectarian and divisive.  
Precisely at a time when the drive to communalise education has been 
intensified, two industrialists from the Prime Minister’s Council for Trade and 
Industry have produced a report on education. The Birla-Ambani Report can be 
seen as an attempt to communalise education. If education is communalised and 
privatised as the Birla-Ambani Report prescribes, then education becomes a 
commodity which is an essential input for industry (Siddiqui, 2014d). Then there is 
no need for social scientists to critically question the structures. So I think the 
explicit advocacy of privatising education in the Birla-Ambani Report and the 
design to communalise education share a similar idea of what the education system 
should be namely, that education should produce obedient, disciplined servants of 
the established order who are competent technicians. 
The RSS has a long term strategy to subvert intellectual spaces, capture 
institutions of higher education and research, not through logical debates and facts, 
but through violence and intimidation and often with the aid of the state machinery. 
The danger is that the authoritarianism is spreading across educational institutions. 
From control of syllabus to control of thoughts is conducted according to the 
wishes of the Hindutva, which is the real danger of fascism hanging over India. 
Fascism assumes different forms according to historical, social and economic 
conditions and national peculiarities. In India, fascism seems to be emerging under 
the garb of nationalism, which is causing havoc to India’s constitution and 
democratic morality. If India would like to be part of the civilised world, its leaders 
should safeguard the rule of law and uphold the constitution and pluralistic values. 
There is no doubt that the Modi government exhibits fascist tendencies. What 
we are witnessing currently in India above all is a powerful paramilitary 
organisation the RSS, who are shaping the outlook and policies of the government 
and then also there is the menace of both their cow vigilantes ‘gaorashaks’ and 
their youth group the ABVP (Akhil Bharatiya VidyartiPrashid). They are 
mimicking the Balillas in fascist Mussolini’s Italy, bullying university students in 
Allahabad, Delhi and Hyderabad, those who raised question on caste 
discrimination or income inequality or about national oppression in Kashmir are 
being called ‚anti-national‛. They also have found an external enemy within the 
country i.e. Muslims and subjugating and despising them.  
There seems to be a ‚fusion‛ of the interests of the business and the state, which 
is close to an explicit definition of fascism and all these are hallmarks of fascism in 
India. The fusion of neo-liberalism and Hindutva is being cemented with more 
support from big business.  
Finally, the semi-fascist authoritarian right wing Indian government promises 
no prospects whatsoever to farmers, workers, minorities, tribal people and Dalits 
and provides illusory hopes to the majority of the people. The RSS is trying to 
divide the society along religious lines. This will shake the foundations of India’s 
pluralistic character. These trends are dangerous, self-defeating and threaten 
India’s security and well-being. The religion should not necessarily be an 
imperative for being a nationalist and composite culture and shared heritage and 
plurality should be acknowledged. The study also suggests that in order to preserve 
the secular and democratic basis of India’s constitution and pluralistic culture of 
society, all liberal, secular, left and progressive forces need to unite to combat these 
fascist forces.  
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